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FOREWORD 
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey 
was established by the Secretary of War on 3 
November 1944, pursuant to a directive from the 
late President Roosevelt. Its mission was to 
conduct an impartial and expert study of the 
effects of our aerial attack on Germany, to be 
used in connection with air attacks on Japan and 
to establish a basis for evaluating the importance 
and potentialities of air power as an instrument 
of military strategy, for planning the future 
development of the United States armed forces, 
and for determining future economic policies 
with respect to the national defense. A summary 
report and some 200 supporting reports contain-
ing the findings of the Survey in Germany have 
been published. 
On 15 August 1945, President Truman requested 
that the Survey conduct a similar study of the 
effects of all types of air attack in the war against 
Japan. The officers of the Survey in Japan, who 
are all civilians were: 
Franklin D'Olier, Chairman. 
Paul H. Nitze, Henry C. Alexander, Vice 
Chairmen. 
Harry L. Bowman, J. K. Galbraith, 
Rensis Likert, Franl{ A. MeN amee, 
Fred Searls, Jr., Monroe E. Spaght, 
Dr. Louis R. Thompson, Theodore P. 
Wright, Directors. 
Walter Wilds, Secretary. 
The Survey's complement provided for 300 
civilians, 350 off10ers, and 500 enlisted men. The 
military segment of the organization was drawn 
from the Army to the extent of 60 percent, and 
from the Navy to the extent of 40 percent. Both 
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the Army and the Navy gave the Survey all pos-
sible assistance in furnishing nien, supplies, trans-
port and information. The Survey operated from 
headquarters established in Tokyo early in Sep-
tember 1945, with subheadquarters in Nagoya, 
Osaka, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, and with mobile 
teams operating in other parts of Japan, the 
islands of the Pacific, and the Asiatic mainland. 
It was possible to reconstruct much of wartime 
Japanese military planning and execution engage-
ment by engagement and campaign by campaign, 
and to secure reasonably accurate statistics on 
Japan's economy and war-production plant by 
plant, and industry by industry. In addition, 
studies were conducted on Japan's over-all stra-
tegic plans and the background of her entry into 
the war, the internal discussions and negotiations 
leading to her acceptance of unconditional sur-
render, the course of health and morale among 
the civilian population, the effectiveness of the 
Japanese civilian defense organization, and the 
effects of the atomic bombs. Separate reports 
will be issued covering each phase of the study. 
The Survey interrogated more than 700 Jap-
anese military, Government, and industrial offi-
cials. It also recovered and translated many 
documents which have not only been useful to 
the Survey, but will also furnish data valuable for 
other studies. Arrangements have been made tv 
turn over the Survey's files to the Central Intelli-
gence Group, through which they will be available 
for further examination and distribution. 
The present report was prepared by the Chair-
man's Office rmder the editorship of Commander 
Walter Wilds, USNR. 
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JAPAN'S STRUGGLE TO END THE WAR 
Preface 
While the impact of Allied air operations in the 
entire Pacific war bore directly upon the enemy's 
military and economic capabilities for resisting, 
only by translating these military and economic 
effects into political events could our announced 
war aim of unconditional surrender be realized. 
Japan's acceptance of defeat without invasion 
while still possessed of 2}~ million combat-equipped 
troops and 9,000 Kamikaze airplanes in the home 
islands, reveal how persuasively the consequences 
of our operations were translated into political 
results. The nature of Japanese politics and its 
vulnerability and responses to air assault consti-
tuted therefore a major and significant line of 
inquiry for the Survey. 
The "political target" comprised a ganglion of 
Army, Navy, Government, and Imperial house-
hold factions which together decided major ques-
tions of national policy. Fortunately, most of 
the pertinent questions relating to how Japan was 
brought to acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration 
find their answers in the simple chronology of 
events which can now be narrated in some detail 
for the period from the collapse of Tojo in July 
1944, to the imperial rescript of 15 August 1945. 
The evidence is .chiefly in the testimony obtained 
by Survey interrogation of the Army, Navy, 
Government, and Imperial household leaders who 
participated or were influential in the struggle 
within Japan over whether to continue the war or 
to accept surrender. The inquiry might have 
benefited from testimony of certain key figures 
who were not available tv the Survey. Tojo, 
Koiso, Togo, and a few others impounded for trial 
as war criminals could not be interrogated. A 
few, notably General Anami, the War Minister in 
the Suzuki cabinet, had committed suicide. Since 
the Emperor's participation in the crucial events 
of the period preceding surrender had been re-
vealed and corroborated by other participants, an 
interview with Hirohito would not have been 
productive. It is felt that the general picture of 
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the course of events would not have been changed 
materially had these persons been available for 
interrogation. 
I. Some Properties of the Political Target 
To assess the events of surrender requires a 
capsule reminder of the interrelated pressures, 
the interlocking mechanism of Japanese politics. 
The starting point is that Japan was governed 
largely by a consensus among the oligarchy of ruling 
factions at the top. No major decisions of 
national policy could be reached until such a 
consensus had been obtained. This process in-
evitably took time and involved complicated 
pressures and struggles of will among those of 
differing opinions. 
A flow-chart of the chief pressures would show 
the Lord Privy Seal (Marquis Koichi Kido 
throughout the war period) as the Emperor's 
political agent, an observer and estimator of the 
current GovernmenVs problems and its capabili-
ties for coping with them. To one side, clear of 
responsibility or authority, but in this instance 
with pipe lines into the Government which in-
formed them of the true state of affairs, were the 
senior statesmen or Jushin. These ex-premiers 
could not enforce their views, but did apply 
persuasive and informed pressure on the Privy 
Seal and other Government leaders. The Jushin 
also had interlocking membership with the 
Privy Council which approved important decisions 
in foreign policy, and individual Jushin were 
frequently close to the Emperor. Then there 
was the Cabinet, which once formed could perpet-
uate itself so long as it was strong and successful. 
An important test of its strength and success 
was its ability to absorb or modify the views and 
policies of the Army and Navy, who named their 
own Cabinet ministers, whose ministers and chiefs 
of staff had direct access to the Emperor, and who 
were influenced until the end by the fanaticism 
of the majority of Army officers and younger 
Navy officers. One important wartime innova-
tion to this flow-chart, the Supreme War Direc-
tion Council or Inner Cabinet, will be explained 
in a later section dealing with Koiso's time. 
This political mechanism had several special 
characteristics which were peculiar to our eyes and 
important to these events: (l) the Lord Privy 
Seal was the custodian of the Emperor's political 
powers and chief protector of the "national 
polity" or Tenno system; (2) the Japanese had a 
fine penchant for diffusing political responsibility; 
(3) politicians and ardent militarists, as did the 
Japanese people themselves, viewed the Emperor 
and sacred homeland through an emotional and 
reverent haze; (4) the system of Government 
afforded enormous areas wherein personal j udg-
ments and estimates of a small group determined 
ultimate policy; (5) opinions and attitudes of the 
general public had significance only as a single and 
subsidiary factor in the considerations of the 
leaders. 
II. Behind the Collapse of Tojo 
In the period betwePn the Pearl Harbor attack 
and June 1944, Japan's defeats at Midway, in the 
Solomons, New Guinea, and the Marshalls, 
coupled with the crippling effects of her shipping 
losses, produced political consequences which were 
appa.rent in frequent cabinet shuffles, Tojo's in-
crease of personal authority through the multiple 
Cabinet jobs he assumed, and tightened controls 
intensifying the Government's efforts to program 
military output for a protracted war. The first 
definitive break in the political coalition which 
began the war occurred following our success at 
Saipan. Ti\n days thereafter, on 18 July 1944, 
the cabinet headed by Gen. Hideki Tojo fell, after 
being continuously in office since 20 October 1941. 
This marked a significant turn in the course of 
Japan's wartime politics, the importance of 
which in retrospect is difficult to overstress. It 
was not merely the result of an immediate crisis. 
Even at that. early date, there were symptoms 
that opposing elements had finally found means 
of applying pressure against the fanatic exponents 
in Japan's militarist clique. It revealed in clear 
trace the effective, though still undercover, in-
tervention of factions which had either opposed 
war before Pearl Harbor, or gone along, or "re-
tired" in the first phases of the conflict. 
To explain the dilemmas and activities of those 
leaders who felt in the spring of 1944 that Japan 
was facing certain defeat or at least that the time 
had come for positive steps to end the war, it is 
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useful to restate briefly the basis on which Ja.pan 
began the war in December, 1941. Japan en-
tered the war securely in the hands of the radical 
military clique that originally rose to power in 
Manchuria and was led and symbolized by Tojo. 
This group had already achieved a police state 
and the controlling position in Japanese policy 
during its uneasy coalition with the conservatives 
in the two preceding Konoye governments. It is 
noteworthy that the clique took Japan to war 
without concrete minimum or maximum ob-
jectives nor any clear conception as to how the 
war could be brought to a close. The decision to 
attack was roughly calculated as a two-way 
gamble. If the European Axis defeated Soviet 
Russia, Japan would require chips to play on the 
winning side at the peace settlement with the 
United States and Britain that might well follow. 
On the other side, and independent of European 
events, a quick drive to the Southern Resources 
Area accompanied by a series of stunning and 
crippling defeats of the United States forces 
would redre~s Japan's relative strength and create 
a situation in which the United States might be 
willing to negotiate a peace by trading out the 
issues on terms favorable to Japan. Great con-
fidence was put in the eventual superiority of 
Japan's fighting spirit over the potential material 
superiority of the United St"'>i>es. This calcula-
tion, whatever its other shurtcomings, obviously 
contained at least two serious misreadings re-
garding the United States, first, in failing to 
appreciate the tenacious and passionate finality 
with which America would prosecute the war, and 
second, in underestimating the military importance 
of the enormously greater economic potential 
with which the United States would create and 
bring to bear a technically superior force. 
The risks involved were understood and asserted 
by some leaders in the debates which preceded 
Pearl Harbor. Their original concern gave them 
a basis for recognizing as early as spring, 1944, 
that Japan was facing ultimate defeat. By that 
time United States determination to fight and 
her ability to mount successful thrusts in the 
Pacific even before opening the second European 
front, had already been demonstrated for all who 
knew the true situation to see. The political 
problem of those who saw the situation was to 
discover and circulate among other leaders in 
retirement or outside the government a true pic-
ture of the war, and then to unseat the Tojo gov-
ernment in favor of one which would bring the 
war to an end. Prime illustrations of such moves 
at this time were the operations of Takagi and 
Sakomizu. 
Rear Adm. Soichi Takagi, who was attached to 
the ministerial secretariat of the Naval General 
Staff, made a study between 20 September 1943 
and February 1944, of the war's battle lessons up 
to that time. He concluded that Japan could not 
win and verbally presented his findings in March 
1944 to Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai and Vice Adm. 
Seibi Inouye. Takagi's study, interestingly 
enough, was undertaken at the end of the second 
year of the war- the time beyond which, the 
Japanese Navy's top command had estimated 
before hostilities, Japan could not fight a successful 
war. Takagi's estimate was based on an analysis 
of fleet, air, and merchant ship losses suffered to 
date, the serious difficulties in acquiring essential 
imported materials, the internal confusion in 
Japan, and a growing feeling among the "intelli-
gentsia" that Tojo should be let out. It seemed 
clear to Takagi that potential long-range air at-
tacks on the home islands and Japan's inability 
to import essential materials for production had 
created a situation which dictated that Japan 
should seek a compromise peace. In Takagi's 
view Japan at this time should have envisaged 
withdrawing from China and giving up both 
Korea and Formosa as part of the peace terms. 
His study in any case documented the fears 
Yonai and others held before the war and lent 
support to the increasing but still carefully guarded 
concern of their fellow Jushin that all was not well 
with Tojo's prosecution of the war. 
Hisatsune Sakomizu is another early example of 
a connecting link between the unpleasant facts of 
the war and the senior statesmen outside the 
Government. As a member of the Cabinet Plan-
ning Board in 1943- 44, he had given information 
as to the unfavorable war situation to his father-
in-law, Admiral Keisuka Okada, who retailed it 
to Kido among others. Okada also had word sent 
to Tojo that it would be best for him to resign. 
All this was not only educational as to ,Japan's 
true condition, but indirectly helped to build up 
political pressure for the fall of Tojo. Among 
important examples of the wa.v this pressure 
worked were: (1) Tojo had to reconstruct his 
cabinet just before the Marianas campaign (Saipan 
was invaded on 15 June 1944), when Shinsuka 
Kishi, the Commerce and Agriculture Minister, 
and Mamoru Shigemitsu, the Foreign Minister, 
threatened to withdraw; (2) Y onai, supported by 
710381-4.&--2 
-- - ----- --- - -
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. the Jushin, refused Tojo's request that he join the 
cabinet as minister-without-portfolio; and (3) the 
resignation of Shigetaro Shimada, the Navy 
Minister, which helped to force out Tojo 3 days 
afterward, had been actively assisted by the 
senior statesmen. 
These steps give the pattern of the behind-scenes 
talks and illustrate the combined efforts of (1) 
those who already knew that Japan, facing defeat, 
should save itself by accepting Allied terms, 
(2) those who believed Japan should take active 
steps to end the war, hoping to achieve terms 
better than unconditional surrender, and (3) those 
who realized Japan's situation was desperate, but 
thought improved resistance could be achieved 
only by dropping Tojo. 
III. The Koiso Government 
The loss of Saipan, followed by Tojo's collapse, 
marked a major turning point of the war and 
brought forth the Cabinet of Kuniaki Koiso, a 
retired Army general who was known as a Tojo 
critic. This government was a disappointment to 
the more zealous peacemakers and conceivably an 
inept choice of that ever-cautious political litmus 
paper, Marquis Kido. Nevertheless, Koiso's gov-
ernment broke the grip of the Tojo clique as the 
ruling faction, took important and necessary steps 
toward peace, and may even have been an un-
avoidable step in the transition from Tojo to the 
surrender Cabinet of Admiral Suzuki. -
When designated to succeed Tojo, Kosio re-
ceived an Imperial admonition to give .Japan's 
situation a "fundamental reconsideration" looking 
to the termination of the war. If this murky in-
junction was intended to seek peace, it early be-
came clear that the new government as a whole by 
no means understood its mission since the "recon-
sideration" resulted in a decision to continue the 
war with renewed vigor and further sacrifice. 
At this time, in the late summer of 1944, in-
tensive air assault on the home islands had not yet 
begun. But output of a number of essential 
items had already passed the peak, shipping 
losses had reduced imports of essential materials 
below the needs of the existing industrial plant 
capacity. Japan faced a declining output of such 
war necessities as aircraft, oil, transport, steel, and 
coal. Although public confidence in the war re-
mained high, morale of the leaders and "intelligen-
tsia" was falling, principally as knowledge of 
previous defeats and difficulties became more 
----- - -- - ----- - -- ---
generally spread to the further discredit of the 
military factions. 
Among the first moves of the new Koiso govern-
ment was the creation of the Supreme War Direc-
tion Council. On 5 August 1944, 3 weeks after 
the fall of Tojo, this new Inner Cabinet was 
formed. Announced purpose of the Council was 
"to formulate a fundamental policy for directing 
the war and to adjust the harmonization of the 
combined strategy for politics and war". It com-
prised six regular members-the Premier, Foreign 
Minister, Army Minister, Navy :Minister, Army 
Chief of Staff, and Navy Chief of Staff- who 
could, however, bring in any other Cabinet min-
ister as a regular member when necessary. In 
addition, the two deputy chiefs of staff attended 
meetings but did not vote, and the Council had 
a secretariat. The group was formed originally 
as a liaison between the military and the Cabinet, 
but its composition and dominant role made it in 
practice an inner war cabinet concerned with the 
highest policies and plans such as measures to 
maintain fighting strength, central economic deci-
sions, whether to continue the war, etc. The 
agenda originated within the Council itself. Its 
decisions had to be ratified by the full cabinet 
before becoming final. It also had direct access 
to the Emperor and the Emperor could himself 
initiate meetings with the Council. The Council, 
lilce the Cabinet, did not work on majority votes, 
but on general agreement or "unity". Important 
issues on which unity was lacking were presented 
to the Emperor usually in the form of alternatives 
for his choice. To one acquainted with the Jap-
anese talent for divided authority and controls, 
piecemeal responsibility and decisions, and con-
sidering the past failures to cope administratively 
with the necessities of total war, the Council may 
be taken as an outstanding accomplishment. 
Nor is it possible to exaggerate the central 
importance of this committee, for certainly from 
early May of 1945 until the August surrender the 
enemy's principal problem was to give expression 
to its political decision to end the war. During 
that period the military and economic and morale 
effects of our operations were significant chiefly as 
they bore directly upon the top political decision 
already made and the struggle between those 
political leaders who had already determined to 
find a way out of the war and the militarists who 
were determined to continue it. Cumulative 
difficulties and defeats bred further determination 
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among the peace seekers who increasingly opposed 
the intransigency of the militarists. 
The Council accordingly was on one hand a 
symbol and test of how far Japan's original war-
making coalition had been discredited and liqui-
dated, and on the other hand a successful reinte-
gration of the ruling factions which could act with 
authority and purpose in solving their dilemma. 
The magnitude of this last point can be shown by 
citing the following considerations. First, the 
two chiefs of staff (and their deputies) who 
formerly had been not merely responsible for 
executing operational plans but also almost auto-
cratically capable of formulating them, were now 
drawn into discussions of over-all national policy, 
matters of economic capability, the political 
realities, etc.; the military were finally harnessed 
and joined to political, economic, and civilian 
requirements. Second, the Council afforded a 
few key ministers who were determined on peace 
a more effective and enhanced basis for achieving 
it through domination of a small group, working 
in the greatest secrecy, with direct and official 
access to the Emperor. 
Early in September 1944, Yonai, who had be-
come Vice Premier and Navy Minister under 
Koiso, directed Takagi to resume his secret studies 
of steps to get out of the war. Working with 
Yonai and the Navy Vice Minister, Vice Adm. 
Seibi Inouye, Takagi considered such questions as 
(1) how to get Army agreement to end the war; 
(2) issues involved in possible Allied terms such as 
demands on Japan after the war, reparations, 
protection of the "national polity"; (3) the prob-
lem of public opinion and morale in the event of 
peace; (4) how to reach the Emperor and work 
through him to accomplish their purpose. As 
these studies progressed, private briefing sessions 
were held with Prince Fumimaro Konoye, Kido, 
Marquis Tsuneo Matsudaira, the Imperial House-
hold Minister, Okada, and a number of others. 
Sometime later Admiral Koshiro Oikawa, the 
chief of naval staff, and Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, 
the deputy chief of naval staff, were informed of 
these maneuvers. Contacts were also established 
with Army people. Takagi testified that quite 
a number of them were convinced and some, in 
fact, brought pressure upon the Army minister. 
This served, however, only to stiffen the Army's 
attitude against all peace moves and many on 
the Army side recanted for reasons of discipline 
and personal safety. 
In these conversations some differences of opin-
ion emerged as to peace terms-some favored 
giving up all occupied territories, whereas others 
thought Formosa and Korea were required for 
food. It was generally agreed that the only way 
to reach the public was through the Emperor, if 
conformity to a peace decision were to be secured 
and a possible military coup avoided. Okada 
approached Kido frequently on this subject. 
Takagi reported that Konoye had already made 
up his mind along similar lines before these talks 
began. Takagi further stated that as a result of 
these activities they were prepared to carry 
through toward peace in the face of Army oppo-
sition, if need be even to the point of withstanding 
an Army revolt. 
Although the peacemakers were well represented 
in the Koiso government, the cabinet's decision 
was taken to continue and renew the war effort 
hoping for an improved position from which to 
seek a compromise peace. The validity of the 
peacemakers' estimates was demonstrated by 
further attrition of air forces and shipping, a 
declining basic industrial production and a seri-
ously lowered civilian livelihood. In the mean-
time, the initial air raids on the Empire coupled 
with loss of the Philippines had a deepening effect 
upon these attitudes. The leaders especially 
feared the threat to production, the decline in 
public morale, and a break-up of Japan as Ger-
many even then was breaking up. 
By December 1944 private conversations among 
the top ruling factions, including Kido, Konoye, 
Yonai, Okawa, Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, etc., 
were addressed to problems created by urgent 
need for peace. The Emperor on his own initia-
tive in February 1945 had a series of interviews 
with the senior statesmen whose consensus was 
that Japan faced certain defeat and should seek 
peace at once. 
Discussed at least, during March 1945, was the 
plan to initiate peace steps through the mediation 
of China. Prince N aruhiko Higashikuni was 
the chief ad vocate of this scheme, and it received 
some consideration and support among the Jushin 
and at the foreign office. Choice of China as 
Allied negotiator was based in part on the ingen-
. uous notion that since "she was a neighbor and 
fellow member of the co-prosperity sphere", her 
mediation would be more suitable than direct 
approaches to the United States. Terms were 
to be based on Japan returning to her pre-1931 
boundaries. There is no clear evidence available 
to the Survey as to how far the plan was carried, 
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but what is significant here is that at least by 
March 1945, a specific peace overture was under 
cabinet discussion. 
In this desperate situation, and since important 
eleme.nts both within the government and among 
the leaders outside were favoring and initiating 
peace moves, it is legitimate to ask why the Koiso 
cabinet did not end the war in the fall of 1944. 
Members of Japan's original war-making coalition, 
though no longer in full control, still had great 
strength within the top Army command, the 
middle ranks of both services, and the bureaucracy 
of the Government. They constituted a distinct 
threat of revolt or a coup in the estimate of the 
civilian and Imperial household leaders. Certain 
general and psychological factors also determined 
the further conduct of the war and the central 
decision by the Koiso regime: (1) It is clear that 
the Japanese leaders entered the war deeply con-
vinced that they were fighting for their very 
national existence and life, whereas the United 
States they believed was merely pressing for eco-
nomic advantages and a set of principles, but not 
for vital security. (2) Japan had no specific plan 
other than negotiation for ending the war she 
began. A predilection for negotiation- demon-
strated in terminating the Russo-Japanese war, 
efforts to enlist the United States in bringing the 
China Incident to a close, etc.- maintai'1ed a hope 
that Japan could trade it out with the Allies. 
(3) The Casablanca statement and the Cairo 
Declaration setting forth Allied terms for uncon-
ditional surrender were still considered by Japan's 
leaders to be just declarations, not actual final 
terms to be imposed. (4) The desire to save face, 
to preserve the Tenno system, and fear of the 
military and the police at this period helped the 
factions favoring continued resistance. (5) The 
information policy of minimizing United States 
successes and capabilities, while distorting their 
own losses and exaggerating their ability to con-
duct effective operations, had left the people 
ignorant of the fact of Japan's actual military 
situation at this time. Some Government factions 
feared internal chaos, "communistic revolts and 
disorganization" if the true situation became 
lmown. 
Thus so nicely balanced were the ruling factions 
and cliques that their interrelation conditioned 
the expression of policy as w~ll as its formation, 
and accounts in part at least for the unusual time-
lapse between the top civilian political decision to 
accept defeat and the final capitulation. The 
result in the Koiso cabinet at least was a tempo-
rary stalemate. 
The Okinawa landings on 1 April were quickly 
followed by Koiso's fall on 8 April and the desig-
nation of Admiral Baron Kantaro Suzuki as 
Premier. 
IV. The Suzuki Cabinet 
Kido's estimate affords the best guide to the 
political situation which produced the Suzuki 
government. The Lord Privy Seal stated to the 
Survey that Japan's situation called for a man who 
could think fundamentally, had deep convictions 
and great personal courage. Although many 
among the peacemakers had long favored · a 
stronger man than Koiso, Kido at least was con-
vinced that so long as Germany remained in the 
war Japan would be in danger of a military coup 
in the event firm and positive steps were taken 
immediately to end the war. In any case the 
hopes for positive steps under Koiso's aegis were 
not fulfilled, primarily becnuse he was not strong 
enough to stand up to the military. When Suzuki 
was named Premier, Kido stated the question 
was not whether to end the war, but by what 
means and how quickly. 
Suzuki informed the Survey that when he 
assumed office "it was the Emperor's desire to 
make every effort to bring the war to a conclusion 
as quickly as possible, and that was my purpose". 
This created a position Suzuki described as diffi-
cult. On the one hand he had instructions from 
the Emperor to arrange an end to the war; on the 
other hand any of those opposing this policy who 
learned of such peace moves would be apt to attack 
or even assassinate him. Thus with the general 
staffs, Government in general, and the people, he 
advocated increased war effort and determination 
to fight, whereas "through diplomacy and any 
other means available" he had to negotiate with 
other countries to stop the war. 
Almost immediately, Suzuki ordered his chief 
cabinet secretary, Sakomizu, to make a study of 
Japan's fighting capabilities and whether they 
were sufficient to continue the war. Sakomizu 
concluded in May that Japan could not continue 
the war, basing his estimate on Japanese studies 
as to the inability to produce aircraft, losses and 
damage to shipping, the precarious food situation 
and the antiwar sentiments . of the people. (A 
copy of this estimate came into Survey hands 
from Yonai in November 1945, and is appended 
in translation as "Survey of National Resources as 
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of 1-10 June 1945.") Suzuki, who agreed with 
the estimate, presented it to the Emperor .. Con-
currently he asked ex-Premier Koki Hirota to 
sound out th(' Russian ambassador to Tokyo, 
Y akov A. Malik, privately as to the Russian 
attitude toward interceding with America. 
Early in May (prior to the 18th according to 
a statement of Navy Chief of Staff, Admiral Soemu 
Toyoda) the Supreme War Direction Council 
began to discuss ways and means of ending the 
war. Concurrently other meetings of the Council 
were goiug on with the view of obtaining Russia's 
services at an opportune time. Foreign Minister 
. Togo was leader of this. While Hirota was 
.talking with Malik, Ambassador Sato had been 
instructed in Moscow to prepare th~ way for 
a Japanese emissary to discuss improvement of 
Soviet-Japanese relations and Russia's intercession 
to end the war. Specific terms for ending the war 
apparently did not come up at this time, but the 
Council was prepared that whatever the result 
they "would be worse than prewar conditions". 
The Potsdam Declaration had not been issued, but 
it was felt that the Cairo Declaration terms would 
not actually be applied; it was looked upon as 
a declaration only, whose terms could be reduced 
by negotiating and by being in a position to exact 
"hea.vy sacrifices" if the war continued. 
Thus during the forepart of May two separate 
but interrelated topics were before the Inner 
Cabinet, one dealing with Japan's inability to 
continue the war, the other initiating talks with 
Russia for intercession. Shortly after the end 
of the European war, 8 May, the War Minister, 
General Korechika Anami, asked the Cabinet 
for an Imperial conference to decide the "funda-
mental principle of the war," that is whether to 
continue it. This action, while not indicating 
that the army was ready to quit (on the contrary 
the war minister and army chief of staff urged 
continuance of hostilities), did confirm Kido's 
belief that the Army would permit open consider-
ation of the question within the Cabinet only 
after Germany's collapse. Perhaps even more 
important it was an affirmative test of the wisdom 
in selecting Anami as War Minister. For even 
though he held out to the last against uncondi-
tional surrender (Anami committed suicide on 15 
August), at no time did he obstruct the positive 
peace steps which were being taken by Suzuki 
and the others, although by resigning he might 
have forced the Suzuki government out of office. 
This negative support of the peace moves by 
certain Army leaders would have afforded an 
interesting line of inquiry had Anami et al been 
available to the Survey for questioning. The 
N a.vy of course was divided, with Yonai among 
the foremost advocates of peace and Admiral 
Soemu Toyoda, the Navy Chief of Staff, siding 
with the Army. But Toyoda also was restrained 
in his opposition to Cabinet peace councils; he 
testified: 
Only two persons in all of the Navy ·had any knowl-
edge of the discussions relating to intervention of Russia, 
the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Navy General 
Staff. It may be (Toyoda continued) that since frequent 
conferences were being held some of the others high up 
in the Navy Ministry might have had some suspicions. 
and because I felt that such might be the case I stated 
to my deputy chief of staff that although conversations 
were being carried out relative to the conclusion of the 
war, that was not an affair with which officers should be 
concerned * * * I believe that a similar situation 
prevailed in the Army , that only two officials had definite 
knowledge of these discussions. 
From June until the close of the war, the nan·a-
tive of political events in Japan is clear and rather 
detailed from the testimony of Y onai, Toyoda, 
Suzuki, Umezu, and Sakomizu, corroborated by 
Kido, Konoye, Hiranuma, and others. After 
Anami's request for an Imperial conference 
Sakomizu prepared a statement for that occasion 
which opened by saying that the war should be 
"accomplished", and the Emperor's reign and the 
homeland kept intact. This was followed by the 
details of Sakomizu's estimate prepared shortly 
after Suzuki assumed office. On 6 June the six 
regular members of the Council discussed what 
steps should be taken to prosecute the war. Also 
at the meeting were the chief cabinet secretary, 
the chief of the Navy's military affairs bureau, the 
chief of the Army bureau of military affairs, the 
head of the Cabinet Research Bureau and the 
1v1inister of Agriculture and Commerce. The 
conclusion was that w1less some radical measure 
could be adopted to arouse the people, theN ation's 
war power was bound to decline very rapidly. At 
this session, as Toyoda explained, 
No one expressed the view that we should ask for 
peace- when a large number of people are present it 
is difficult for any one member to say that we should so 
entreat. 
On 8 June the six regular members of the Coun-
cil conferred with the Emperor. The statement 
was read by the Emperor who made no comment at 
this meeting. Each of the others expressed his 
own official opinion, but none as yet expressed 
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his real feelings. On 20 June the Emperor on 
his own initiative called the six council members 
to a conference and stated that it was necessary 
to have a plan to close the war at once, as well as 
a plan to defend the home islands. He asked 
what the council thought of that idea. The 
Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the 
Navy Minister stated that they fully concurred 
with the Imperial view and that such steps were 
then being taken to that end. Then the Emperor 
in turn asked when the ministers expected they 
would be able to send a special ambassador to 
Moscow. The reply was that it was uncertain 
but they hoped he could be sent before the Pots-
dam conference. Sakomizu testified that after 
this expression from the Emperor, Suzuki decided 
he could stop the war; when he returned from 
the conference he told Sakomizu "Today the 
Emperor said what everyone has wanted to say 
but yet was afraid to say." 
After that the Government redoubled its talks 
with Russia and decided to send Prince Konoye 
to Moscow if he were persona grata. On <10 July 
the Emperor called Foreign Minister Shigenori 
Togo and said, "As it is now early July should not 
our special ambassador be dispatched to Moscow 
without delay?" Since Soviet Ambassador Malik 
was ill in Tokyo and the conversations the1·e were 
not progressing, Sato was again instructed to put 
the matter directly to the Vice Commissar for 
Foreign Affairs in Moscow. Russia asked for 
more details concerning the mis~ion and Sato 
was directed to explain the mission as follows: 
(1) to make an improvement in relations between 
Russia and Japan (in view of Russia's denuncia-
tion of the neutrality pact), and (2) to ask Russia 
to intercede with the United States in order to 
stop the war. The Soviets replied on 13 July that 
since Stalin and Molotov were just leaving for 
Potsdam no answer could be given until their 
return to Moscow. On 12 July meanwhile the 
Emperor had called in Konoye and secretly in-
structed him to accept any terms he could get and 
to wire these terms direct to the Emperor. 
Konoye also testified that when Sa to was sounding 
out the Russians he reported the Russians would 
not consider a peace role unless the terms were 
unconditional surrender, and that this reply had a 
great influence on the Emperor. 
In the days before the Potsdam Declaration, 
Suzuki, Togo, andY onai became pessimistic about 
the Russian negotiations. They expected even-
tually that they would have some answer; but 
if it were unfavorable they concluded that their 
only recourse would be to broadcast directly to the 
United States. 
On 26 July the Potsdam Declaration was issued. 
In their deliberations on that statement, which 
began immediately, no member of the Inner Cabi-
net had any objections to ending the war. Suzuki, 
Togo, and Yonai felt that the declaration must 
be accepted as the final terms of peace at once, 
whether they liked it or not. The War Minister 
and the two chiefs of staff on the other hand felt 
that the terms were "too dishonorable". Discus-
sion centered around first the future position of 
the Emperor, second the disposition of war crim-
inals, ap.d third the future form of Japan's "na-
tional polity". 
On 6 August in the midst of these discussions 
an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. 
Early reports to Tokyo described very great 
damage, but the military did not think it was an 
atomic bomb until President Truman's announce-
ment and a mission of Japanese scientists sent to 
Hiroshima confirmed it. On the morning of 7 
August Suzuki and Togo conferred and then re-
ported the news to the Emperor, stating that this 
was the time to accept the Potsdam Declaration. 
The military side still however could not make up 
their minds to accept it. 
These differences continued to be examined and 
hope of favorable word from Russia had been all 
but abandoned when very early in the morning of 
9 August the news arrived that Russia had de-
clared war. Although considerable pessimism had 
prevailed regarding the outcome of the negotia-
tions, the Government ·was not prepared for war 
with the Soviets, nor the military capable of any 
effective counter-plan. Suzuki calculated that he 
had a choice of resigning or taking immediate 
positive action, which could be either declaring 
war on Russia and continuing until the whole 
Nation was destroyed or accepting the Potsdam 
Declaration. He conferred with the Emperor 
around 0700 and after a couple of hours decided to 
accept the Potsdam terms, with which decision 
the Emperor agreed. A meeting of the six regular 
members of the Supreme War Direction Council 
was called for 1000. After two gloomy hours it 
remained deadlocked as before on the 1. wo opposing 
opinions: (1) To accept the Potsdam Declaration 
outright, with the understanding that it did not 
alter the Emperor's legal position; (2) to accept 
the declaration with the following conditions: 
(a) that the Allied forces would not occupy the 
8 
homeland; (b) that the Japanese military and 
naval forces abroad would be withdrawn, dis-
armed and demobilized by Japan itself; (c) that 
all war crimes should be prosecuted by the Japa-
nese Government. 
Suzuki, Yonai, and Togo favored the first 
opinion, whereas Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda 
supported the second. When this three-to-three 
split could not be resolved, the full Cabinet was 
called in, and after an explanation by Togo, nine 
voted for unconditional acceptance, three voted 
for the conditional acceptance and three others 
favored intermediate positions. After a session 
lasting until 2000 without achieving unity, the 
cabinet declared au intermission. In this impasse 
Suzuki decided to request ·an Imperial conference 
for the Inner Cabinet at which the conflicting 
views could be presented and the Emperor's own 
decision sought. At 2330 on the 9th the conference 
was held, with chief cabinet secretary Sakomizu 
and Hiranuma, the Privy Council president, also 
attending. The Potsdam Declaration was first 
read to the Emperor, then Togo expressed his 
opinion, followed by all of the others who stated 
their views. Around 0300 on the lOth Suzuki 
announced (as paraphrased by Sakomizu's tes-
timony): 
We have discussed this question for a long time and 
everyone has expressed his own opinion sincerely without 
any conclusion being reached. The situation is urgent, 
so any delay in coming to a decision should not be tolerated. 
I am therefore proposing to ask the Emperor his own wish 
and to decide the conference's conclusion on that basis. 
His wish should settle the issue, and the Government 
should follow it. 
The Emperor then stated his own view (again 
paraphrased by Sakomizu), 
I agree with the first opinion as expressed by the foreign 
minister. I think I should tell the reasons why I have 
decided so. Thinking about the world situation and the 
internal Japanese situation, to continue the war means 
nothing but the destruction of the whole nation. My 
ancestors and I have always wished to put forward the 
Nation's welfare and international world peace as our 
prime concern. To continue the war now means that 
cruelty and bloodshed will still continue in the world and 
that the Japanese Nation will suffer severe damage. So, 
to stop the war on this occasion is the only way to save 
the Nation from destruction and to restore peace in the 
world. Looking back at what our military headquarters 
have done, it is apparent that their· performance has fallen 
far short of ·the plans expressed. I don't think this 
discrepancy can be corrected in the future. But when I 
think about my obedient soldiers abroad and of those who 
died or were wounded in battle, about those who have lost 
their property or lives by bombing in the homeland, when 
I think of all those sacrifices, I cannot help but feel sad. 
~~ --~-~~~-=~==============~==~~~~~~~~~~~-----------------
I decided that this war should be stopped, however, in 
spite of this sentiment and for more important considera-
tions. 
Suzuki then said, 
The Imperial decision has been expressed. This should 
be the conclusion of the conference. 
Immediately thereafter the full Cabinet resumed 
its meeting and ratified unanimously a decision to 
accept the Potsdam terms provided they did not 
alter the Emperor's · prerogatives. This was 
cabled to the United States through the Swiss 
around 0700 the lOth. The United States reply 
was received from the San Francisco broadcast 
about 0400 on the 12th and officially about 0700 
the 13th. The broadcast reply was immediately 
studied by the Inner Cabinet and the official 
documents put before the full Cabinet meeting 
around 1300 on the 13th. Acceptance was 
favored by 13 ministers, but 3 were opposed. 
Early in the evening the Cabinet recessed. 
Toyoda, the Navy Chief of Staff, stated the 
objections as follows: 
On the question of the Emperor's position, the American 
reply made no direct statement but did state that the 
powers of the Emperor and the Japanese Government 
would be subject to the authority of the Supreme Com-
mander for the Allied Powers. The main point . . . had 
to do with the Emperor's position since it was the convic-
tion of the Japanese people that the Emperor was a living 
god above whom there could be no earthly being. It was 
feared that the Japanese people would not readily accept 
the wording of the reply which placed the Emperor in a 
subordinate position . . . So the suggestion was made to 
query the Allied Governments as to whether it would not 
be possible to have the orders and instruction of the 
Supreme Commander go directly to the Japanese Govern-
ment and those orders passed on by the cabinet to the 
Emperor who ... would carry out the work connected 
with the termination of the war. 
It is not clear whether this objection arose from 
a sincere endeavor to preserve the Tenno system 
through a typically Japanese concern with seman-
tics, or a last-ditch effort to void the decision for 
peace, or fear of a military coup if the Emperor 's 
position were not meticulously preserved. In any 
case, it is significant that the two chiefs of staff 
refused that evening to sign the document, with 
the Premier, which was required for the Govern-
ment to request a conference with the Emperor. 
The two chiefs of staff stayed up all night with 
the Foreign Minister, pressing him to ask the 
American Government for a more "exact" answer. 
The Foreign Minister refused, insisting that it 
would be construed as a refusal of the terms 
offered and thus disrupt the slim string of com-
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munications between the two countries. The 
next morning, about 0800 the 14th, Suzuki decided 
to go to the Emperor privately and ask him to 
call an Imperial conference, which the Emperor 
could do at any time, but the Government could 
not without the consent of the two chiefs of staff. 
The terminal conference was held before the 
Emperor at 1000. Present were the 16 Cabinet 
ministers, the two chiefs of staff, Hiranuma 
representing the Privy Council, the chiefs of the 
bureaus of military and naval affairs, and the chief 
cabinet secretary, Sakomizu. Suzuki announced 
that the Emperor had called the meeting to con-
sider the American reply in his presence, so that 
everyone who had an opinion should express it 
freely. Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda stated that 
the American reply was insufficient, that they 
favored asking again for a more concrete answer, 
or if that were impossible the war should be con-
tinued. All the others favored acceptance. Then 
the Emperor, as quoted by Sakomizu, said: 
"It seems to me that there is no other opinion to sup• 
port your side (the military's). I shall explain mine. I 
hope all of you will agree with my opinion. My opinion 
is the same as the one I expressed the other night. The 
American answer seems to me acceptable." 
He then asked the Government to draft an 
Imperial rescript to stop the war, and offered to 
broadcast the decision to the people. The Cabinet 
returned to their office and formally accepted un-
conditional surrender. 
V. The Political Target Under Assault 
From the foregoing calendar it remains first to 
outline the nature of the political target presented 
by Japan and second to assess various factors 
which contributed to the success of the assault on 
the enemy's will to resist. 
A. To those who thought of Japanese resistance 
ftS typified by a fanatical Japanese soldier who 
fought until rooted out of his last-ditch foxhole, 
the possibility of forcing a surrender appeared to 
be remote. Our aim in the Pacific war was, 
nevertheless, to induce responsible Japanese leaders 
to admit defeat. Compelling such an admission 
at the earliest moment constituted the objective 
of our attack. 
In total war Lhe nature of the political target is 
linked to the political structure and the spirit of 
the enemy. In the case of Japan that spirit 
differed as between the general populace and the 
top ruling elements. This separation of public 
from leaders was an important consideration. 
Japan had long been conditioned to oligarchic 
rule. Rigid police controls allowed the ideas and 
spirit of the leaders to form separately from those 
. of the people. Popular morale therefore became 
just another factor in the reckonings of the ruling 
group. At the war's opening and throughout its 
early stages, the spirit of both leaders and people 
was chauvinistic, aggressive, expansionist. After 
the defeats at Midway, Port Moresby, and 
Guadalcanal, Japan went on the stratE-gic defen-
sive. Though her advance had been stemmed, 
she had won an empire and needed only to con-
5olidate her conquest. Thereafter, under the 
pressure of our counter-offensive which eventually 
exposed her home islands to direct attack, seriously 
reduced her fleet and air forces, and blockaded her 
already inadequate economy, the early hope of 
victory was replaced by fear of defeat. Finally, 
a desperate determination to resist remained. 
Japan's will to resist, the core target of our 
assault, was supported mainly by military poten-
tial, pro-duction potential, morale of the people, 
and such political considerations of the leadership 
as the preservation of the Tenno system, etc. So 
long as these factors supported resistance they 
operated, of course, as impediments to surrender. 
Thus affecting the determination of Japan's 
leaders to continue the war was not alone the 
actual loss of an air force capable of defending the 
home islands, but the loss of hope that this air 
force could be replaced, let alone enlarged. It 
was not necessary for us to bum every city, to 
destroy every factory, to shoot down every air-
plane or sink every ship, and starve the people. 
It was enough to demonstrate that we were 
capable of doing all this-that we had the power 
and the intention of continuing to the end. In 
this fashion, those responsible for the decision to 
surrender felt the twin-impact of our attack which 
made them not only impotent to resist, but also 
destroyed any hope of future resistance. 
The will of the political leaders to resist collapsed 
well before the will of the people as a whole. The 
leaders were, however, unwilling to move too far in 
advance of public opinion. At the time of sur-
render, even though there was little pressure 
toward surrender from the people, their confi-
dence in victory had been thoroughly undermined 
and they accepted the Imperial rescript, perhaps 
with surprise, but not with active resistance as 
some of the leaders had feared. 
One further point should be developed and 
stressed here. The political objective which 
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existed in Japan lay exposed and vulnerable to 
air attack, which fact goes far toward ,explaining 
the true basis for unconditional surrender without 
invasion of the home islands. That vulnerability 
to air attack derived in part from the basic char-
acter of the war in its decisive phases. It turned 
out to be essentially a war to win air control .over 
the Japanese homeland. This concept was not 
merely central to much of the strategy guiding 
our operations, but was thoroughly understood 
and feared by an effective sector of Japanese 
leaders who sought and achieved political power 
to terminate the war. By the summer and fall 
of 1944, and throughout the remainder of the war, 
the validity of their fear was being persuasively 
demonstrated by the application of our air power 
in its several roles. Loss of fleet and air forces, 
without which, as the leaders knew, no effective 
defense could be mounted, was almost entirely 
the result of our air superiority. Vital perimeter 
bases were lost when our air forces neutralized 
them, sealed off both the air and sea reinforce-
ment, and gave direct local support to our occupy-
ing operations. Japan's limited war production, 
already starved for materials through shipping 
lost to our submarines, was further depleted by 
air interdiction of sea communications as new bases 
eventually permitted almost complete blockade 
day and night. Heavy bomber and carrier raids 
against cities, military and industrial installa-
tions, further depleted her remaining resources, 
productivity and transport, lowered morale, and 
brought the true war situation home to the Japa-
nese people. Thus the Japanese leaders lost 
both power and hope of resistance as our air 
weapons exploited air control over the home 
islands. 
B. By relating them to the narrative set forth 
in the first sections of this report, it is possible to 
treat separately the principal contributions to 
surrender made by various factors which bore on 
the terminal events of the war. 
1. Blockade of Japan's r;;ea communications ex-
ploited the basic vulnerability of an island enemy 
which, with inherently second-power resources, 
was struggling to enlarge its capabilities by milk-
ing the raw materials of a rich conquered area. 
Acute dependence upon imports of such basic 
items as oil, iron ore, coal, bauxite, food, etc., 
caused Japan's shipping position even in the fall 
of 1941 to appear deficient to several members of 
the Jushin, whose opinions were declared to Tojo 
before the Pearl Harbor attack. These fears were 
well-founded, at least for long-term fighting, since 
Japan began the war with 6,000,000 tons of mer-
chant shipping, which were barely sufficient for 
estimated minimum requirements. Her capacity 
to build was quickly exceeded by losses. Eighty-
eight percent of Japan's total merchant shipping 
available during the war was sunk. United States 
submarines sank 55 percent of the total lost. Our 
Navy and Army air forces made important con-
tributions by sinking 40 percent of Japan's total 
shipping lost, by interdiction of sea routes, and 
by an aerial mining program carried out by B-29s 
in the last months of the war which sealed off the 
vital Inland Sea and disrupted every major home 
island port. The blockade prevented exploitation 
of conquered resources, kept Japan's economy off 
balance, created shortages of materials which in 
turn limited war production, and deprived her of 
oil in amounts sufficient to immobilize fleet and 
air units and to impair training. These effects 
were intimately associated with the political con-
ditions culminatiug in the fall of Tojo and Koiso. 
The direct military and economic limitations im-
posed by shortages created virtually insoluble 
political as well as economic problems in attempt-
ing to achieve war production adsquate for the 
defense of Japan. The special feeling of vulner-
ability to blockade, to which a dependent island 
people are ever subject, increased and dramatized, 
especially to the leaders, the hopelessness of their 
position and favored the growing conviction that 
the defeat was inevitable. 
2; While the blockade was definitive in stran-
gling Japan's war mobilization and production, it 
cannot be considered separately from the pressure 
of our concurrent military operations, with which 
it formed a shears that scissored Japan's military 
potential into an ineffectual remnant. In the 
early engagements that stemmed the Japanese 
advance and in the subsequent battle for bases, 
the application of our air power against vital forces 
which Japan committed piecemeal in defense of 
these perimeter positions enabled us largely to 
destroy her navy and reduce her air forces to 
impotence before the home islands could be 
brought under direct air attack. Throughout 
these operations we were employing air power 
effectively and potently in ways the Japanese 
leaders understood and feared, and had no ade-
quate defense to withstand. Although a core of 
bitter-end resistance lay in Japan's army and navy 
until the Imperial rescript was signed, it should be 
noted that Tojo's collapse and the introduction of 
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peace-making factions into the succeeding Koiso 
government quickly followed the loss of Saipan in 
July 1944. Also, after the costly and vitiating 
defeats in the Palaus, Philippines, and at lwo Jima, 
Koiso was in turn succeeded shortly after our 
Okinawa landings of 1 April 1945 by the Suzuki 
cabinet, which was formed with the specific man-
date to terminate the war. In these campaigns, 
dictated by our need for air mastery and won by 
immediate air control, while Japan's loss of effec-
tive naval and land-based air forces was over-
whelming, her military attrition was not complete, 
since our operations used up by no means all of 
her ground and Kamikaze forces. Japan's prin-
eipal land armies were in fact never defeated, a 
consideration which also supported the military's 
continued last-ditch resistance to the surrender 
decision. It nevertheless appears that after the 
loss of the Marianas in July- August 1944, the 
military commands, though unconvinced of final 
victory, viewed defense against our subsequent 
operations as affording an opportunity for only a 
limited success, a tactical victory which might, so 
they hoped, have created a purchase from which 
to try for a negotiated peace under terms more 
favorable than unconditional surrender. 
3. Fear of home island bombing was persuasive 
to the political leaders even before its direct effects 
could be felt. News of the B-29 and its intended 
capabilities reached Japan in 1943. B- 29 raids 
on Kyushu and southern Honshu targets began 
from China bases on 15 June 1944. With the loss 
of Saipan in early July 1944, many leaders became 
wholly convinced of Japan's eventual defeat, one 
factor being that from Marianas bases the home-
land would be brought under the kind of intensive, 
shattering a.ir assault even then being administered 
to their German partner. The timing of the · 
strategic bombing attack affected its role in the 
surrender decision. After the :Marianas were lost 
but before the first attacks were flown in N ovem-
ber 1944, Tojo had been unseated and peacemak-
ers introduced into the Government as prominent 
elements. The war economy had already passed 
its peak, fleet 11nd air forces had been critically 
weakened, confidence of the "intelligentsia" in the 
Government and the military had been deflated, 
and confidence of the people in eventual victory 
was weakening. By mid-1944 shortages of food 
and civilian supplies were reflected in reduced liv-
ing standards. Therefore the actual physical 
destruction wrought by strategic bombing as-
sumed the role of an accelerator, to assist and 
expedite forces already in motion. It added a 
tremendous quantitative weight to those forces. 
Since the means of resisting direct air attacks had 
already been largely destroyed, it represented the 
full exploitation of air control by an air weapon. 
These attacks became definitive in the surrender 
decision because they broadened the realization 
of defeat by bringing it home to the people and 
dramatized to the whole nation what the small 
peace party already knew. They proved day in 
and day out, and night after night, that the United 
States did control the air and could exploit it. 
They lowered morale by demonstrating the dis-
advantages of total war directly, added a vital 
increment of both actual and clearly foreseeable 
future production loss by both precision and area 
attacks, and applied pressure on the surrender 
decision by eliminating the hope of successful final 
resistance. 
4. When Japan was defeated without invasion, 
a recurrent question arose as to what effect the 
threat of a home-island invasion had had upon 
the surrender decision. It was contended that 
the th:t·eat of invasion, if not the actual operation, 
was a requirem0nt to induce acceptance of the 
surrender terms. On this tangled issue the evi-
dence and hindsight me clear. The fact is, of 
course, that Japan did surrender without invasion, 
and with its principal armies intact. Testimony 
before the Survey shows that the expected "viola-
tion of the sacred homeland" raised few fears 
which expedited the decision to surrender before-
hand. Government and Imperial household lead-
ers felt some concern for the "destruction of the 
Japanese people", but the people were already 
being shattered by direct air attacks. Anticipated 
landings were even viewed by the military with 
hope that they would afford a means of inflicting 
casualties sufficiently high to improve their 
chances of a negotiated peace. Preparation 
of defenses against landings diverted certain 
resources from dispersal and cushioning moves 
which might have partially mitigated our air 
blows. But in Japan's then depleted state, the 
diversion was not significant. The responsible 
leaders in power read correctly the true situation 
and embraced surrender well before invasion was 
expected. 
5. So long as Germany remained in the war that 
fact contributed to the core of Japanese resistance. 
Slight evidence exists that some hope was held 
for a long-promised German miracle weapon. A 
telegram received on 6 May in the German em-
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hassy at Tokyo revealed that Hitler was dead, the 
promised new weapon had failed to materialize and 
that Germany would surrender within a matter of 
hours. Kido believed, presumably on Japanese 
Army representations, that the Army would not 
countenance peace moves so long as Germany 
continued to ' fight. It is not clear whether this 
was a face-saving position, designed to avoid a 
prior Japanese surrender. In any case on 9 May 
1945, immediately after the Nazi capitulation, 
Gen~ral Anami, the War Minister, asked the Cab-
inet for an Imperial conference to reconsider the 
war situation. The significant fact, however, is 
that Japan was pursuing peace before the Nazis 
collapsed, and the impoverishment and fragmen-
tation of the German people had already afforded 
a portent of similar consequences fox an intran-
sigent Japan. , 
6. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs 
did not defeat Japan, nor by the testimony of the 
enemy leaders who ended the war did they per-
suade Japan to accept unconditional surrender. 
The Emperor, the Lord Privy Seal, the Prime 
Minister, the Foreign M:inister, and the Navy 
Minister had decided as early as May of 1945 that 
the war should be ended even if it meant accept-
ance of defeat on allied terms. The War Minister 
and the two chiefs of staff opposed unconditional 
surrender. The impact of the Hiroshima attack 
was to bring further urgency and lubrication to 
the machinery of achieving peace, primarily by 
contributing to a situation which permitted the 
Prime Minister to bring the Emperor overtly and 
directly into a position where his decision for 
immediate acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration 
could be used to override the remaining objectors. 
Thus, although the atomic bombs changed no 
votes of the Supreme War Direction Council 
concerning the Potsdam terms, they did fore-
shorten the war and expedite the peace. 
Events and testimony wh_ich support these 
conclusions are blue-printed from the chronology 
established in the first sections of this report: 
(a) The mission of the Suzuki government, 
appointed 7 April 1945, was to make peace. An 
appearance of negotiating for terms less onerous 
than unconditional surrender was maintained in 
order to contain the military and bureaucratic 
elements still determined on a final Bushido 
defense, and perhaps even more importantly to 
obtain freedom to create peace with a minimum 
of personal danger and in.ternal obstruction. It 
seems clear however that in extremis the peace-
makers would have peace, and peace on any 
terms. This was the gist of advice given to 
Hirohito by the Jushin in February, the declared 
conclusion of Kido in April, the underlying reason 
for Koiso's fall in April, the specific injunction 
of the Emperor to Suzuki on becoming premier 
which was known to all members of his cabinet. 
· (b) A series of conferences of the Supreme War 
Direction Council before Hirohito on the subject 
of continuing or terminating the war began on 8 
June and continued through 14 August. At the 
8 June meeting the war situation was reviewed. 
On 20 Juno the Emperor, supported by the 
Premier, Foreign Minister, and Navy Minister, 
declared for peace; tho Army Minister and tho 
two chiefs of staff did not concm. On 10 July 
the Emperor again mged haste in the moves to 
mediate through Russia, but Potsdam intervened. 
While the Government still awaited a Russian 
answer, the Hiroshima bomb was dropped on 
6 August. 
(c) Consideration of tho Potsdam terms within 
the Supreme War Direction Council revealed the 
same three-to-three cleavage which first appeared 
at the Imperial conference on 20 June. On the 
morning of 9 August Premier Suzuki and Hirohito 
decided at once to accept tho Potsdam terms; 
meetings and moves thereafter wore designed to 
legalize tho decision and prepare tho Imperial 
rescript. At the conclusive Imperial conference, 
on the night of 9- 10 August, tho Supreme War 
Direction Council still split three-to-throe. It was 
necessary for the Emperor finally to repeat his 
desire for acceptance of tho Potsdam terms. 
(d) Indubitably the Hiroshima bomb and the 
rumor derived from interrogation of an American 
prisoner (B- 29 pilot) who stated that an atom 
bomb attack on Tokyo was scheduled for 12 
August introduced urgency in the minds of the 
Government and magnified the pressure behind 
its moves to end the war. 
7. The sequence of events just recited also 
defines the effect of Russia's entry into the Pacific 
war on 8 August 1945. Coming 2 days after the 
Hiroshima bomb, the move neither defeated 
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Japan nor materially hastened the acceptance of 
surrender nor changed the votes of the Supreme 
War Direction Council. Negotiation for Russia 
to intercede began the forepart of May 1945 in 
both Tokyo and Moscow. Konoye, the intended 
emissary to the Soviets, stated to the Survey that 
while ostensibly he was to negotiate, he received 
direct and secret instructions from the Emperor 
to secure peace at any price, notwithstanding 
its severity. Sakomizu, the chief cabinet secretary, 
alleged that while awaiting the Russian answer on 
mediation, Suzuki and Togo decided that were 
it negative direct overtures would be made to the 
United States. Efforts toward peace through the 
Russians, forestalled by the imminent departure of 
Stalin and Molotov for Potsdam, were answered 
by the Red Army's advance into Manchuria. 
The Kwantung army, already weakened by diver-
sion of its units and logistics to bolster island 
defenses in the South and written off for the de-
fense of Japan proper, faced inescapable defeat. 
There is little point in attempting more precisely 
to impute Japan's unconditional surrender to any 
one of the numerous causes which jointly and 
cumulatively were responsible for Japan's dis-
aster. Concerning the absoluteness of her defeat 
there can be no doubt. The time lapse between 
military impotence and political acceptance of the 
inevitable might have been shorter had the 
political structure of Japan permitted a more rapid 
and decisive determination of national policies. 
It seems clear, however, that air supremacy and 
its later exploitation over Japan proper was the 
major factor which determined the timing of 
Japan's surrender and obviated any need for 
invasion. 
Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts 
and supported by the testimony of the surviving 
Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's 
opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, 
and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, 
Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic 
bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had 
not entered the war, and even if no invasion had 
been planned or contemplated. 
--- - - · ----- -- - --
APPENDIX A-JAPANESE DOCUMENTS 
APPENDIX A-1. ESTIMATE OF JAPANESE 
NATIONAL STRENGTH AT THE OUT-
BREAK OF THE GREATER EAST ASIA 
WAR AS OF DECEMBER 1941 
A. General 
In a greatly changing world situation, the 
policy adopted by the Japanese Empire is to 
attain a position of self-sufficiency based upon 
national strength which it can maintain inde-
pendently. 
In determining the over-all policy of war or 
peace, it is always necessary to make a proper 
estimate of the Nation's strength. 
However, because of extreme difficulty in ob-
taining complete data and because of the many 
complicated and unpredictable factors in the 
changing material resources situation, an estimate 
of the actual stTength of the Empire is not a simple 
matter. Thus, it is a dangerous practice to 
translate national strength into mathematical 
terms and use them without hesitation as the 
criteria in deciding on war or peace. 
B. Scarce Items Preventing Complete Selj-sriffi-
ciency 
1. Rice. 
2. Fuel. 
3. Essential war materials. 
4. Transport capacity. 
C. Examination of Principal Resources 
1. Rice.- Supplies of rice must be obtained 
from French Indochina and Thailand, and these 
supplies can be had if transport space is made 
available. 
2. Fuel estimates: oil:--
(a) Amount stored as of 1 October 1941: 
9,050,000 kiloliters. 
(b) Estimated consumption: 5,500,000 kiloliters 
per year after the outbreak of war. 
Navy, 2,500,000 kiloliters. 
Army, 600,000 kiloliters. 
Civilian requirements, 2,400,000 kiloliters. 
(c) Estimated supply. 
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Table 1 
[TN: Quantities given in kiloliters] 
Domestic Synthetic Oil output Source of supply of occupied! Total output oil territories 
First year __ ____________ __ 200, 000 300,000 300,000 I 800, 000 Second year ______________ 200,000 700,000 2,440,000 3, 340,000 Third year _____________ __ 400, 000 1, 500,000 2, 770,000 6, 670,000 
3. Shipping capacity.- The total transport ca-
pacity for the fiscal year 1941 was 53,000,000 tons. 
At the outbreak of war, Japan will have ships 
totalling 6,100,000 tons at her disposal. The 
total estimated transport capacity for the fiscal 
year 1942 is approximately 85 percent of the 1941 
total or 45,000,000 tons. 
Table 2. Anticipated Damage and Replacement of 
Ships 
[TN: Quantities given in tons] 
First year of war Second year of war 
Third year of 
war 
Anticipated damage_ -1 800, D00-1, 100, 000 I 700, OQ0-800, 000 I 700,000- 800,000 
Replacement__ _______ 300,000 500,000 600,000 
Estimated (shipping) situation after the third 
year of war: 
Total tonnage on hand ____ __ _________ 5, 250,000 
Tonnage required by the Army and 
Navy_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2, 400, 000 
Tonnage required for civilian 
use ________________ 2,850, 000 
4. Iron.- Annual requirements if military prep-
arations progress at the present rate and current 
production capacity is expanded: 
Tons 
Military requirements ____ __ _____ ____ _ 2, 200,000 
Production expansion ________ ____ ____ 1, 600,000 
Civilian requirements ___ _______ _____ _ 1, 500,000 
Miscellaneous ___ ____ ____ ___ __ _____ __ 1, 200,000 
Total __ ___ _____ ___ ______ _____ 6, 500,000 
The iron ore for the above requirement could 
be supplied from Japan, Manchuria, China (in-
cluding Hainan Island) and French Indochina. 
5. Nickel.- The shortage is great and there are 
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i. 
no measures for obtaining supplies myhin our 
present sphere of influence. It must be obtained 
from occupied territories in the south. 
6. Crude rubber.-On the basis of an economic 
agreement, the amount expected from Thailand 
and French Indochina is 45,000 tons. Domestic 
requirements are 65,000 tons and the amount on 
hand is less than 500 tons. Unless the amount 
procured from French Indochina and Thailand is 
increased, or a supply of over 20,000 tons is secured 
from the Nether lands East Indies, the shortage will 
have a great effect upon domestic industry andes-
pecially upon the progress of military preparations. 
7. Tin.--Unless a supply of about 10,000 tons 
annually is procured from Thailand and French 
Indochina, not only would it be impossible to 
meet national requirements, but even peacetime 
military preparations would come to a standstill. 
After 2 years of war, present stock piles would be 
completely depleted. 
8. Ooppe1 .-Supplies on hand will soon be cut 
in half if the present trend continues. Thus, it 
will be necessary to develop sources in the Philip-
pines for supplies of copper. 
9. Lead.- If the present situation continues, the 
supply will be halved. If more lead can be ob-
tained from Burma, the supply will be sufficient. 
10. Oobalt.- Cobalt must be procured from the 
Nether lands East Indies. 
APPENDIX A-2. SURVEY OF NATIONAL 
RESOURCES AS OF 1-10 JUNE 1945 
A. General 
The ominous turn of the war, coupled with the 
increasing tempo of air raids is bringing about 
great disruption of land and sea communications 
and essential war production. The food situation 
has worsened. It has become increasingly diffi-
cult to meet the requirements of total war. More-
over, it has become necessary to pay careful atten-
tion to the trend8 in public sentiment. 
B. National Trends in General 
lVIorale is high, but there is dissatisfaction with 
the present regime. Criticisms of the government 
and the military are increasing. The people are 
losing confidence in their leaders, and the gloomy 
omen of deterioration of public morale is present. 
The spirit of public sacrifice is lagging and among 
leading intellectuals there are some who advocate 
peace negotiations as a way out. It is necessary 
16 
at this time to make careful preparations to cope 
with public reactions in case the Okinawa cam-
paign results in .a disaster and to provide proper 
indoctrination against such an eventuality. More-
over, it is to be expected that in the future the 
enemy's psychological warfare will intensify. 
C. Manpower 
1. As compared with material resources, there 
is a relative surplus of manpower, but there is no 
efficient exploitation of it. Although distribution 
and mobilization of manpower do not respond to 
shifting of production, there is still room for in-
creasing war potential depending on its efficient 
application. On the other hand, the case of mili-
tary mobilization does not permit optimism. 
2. The physical standard and birth rate of the 
people are on the down grade. 
NOTES: 
(a) Surplus manpower: 
Industry _________ 2,000,000 
Commerce________ 500, 000 
Others ___________ 500,000 
Ther e is a reserve of 3,000,000. At present, effort is 
being made to apply this surplus to agriculture and trans-
portation where shortages exist. 
(b) M obtli zati on and distribution of man po.wer.-Workers 
available for various industries in December 1944 (between 
the ages of 16 to 60): 
Male _________ ____ 20,300,000. 
Female ___________ 24,000,000. 
TotaL ___________ 44, 300, 000 (37, 500, 000 al-
ready engaged in industries 
and armed forces). 
(c) Rate of population increase per 1 ,000.-After 1940, 
there is a yearly increase of approximately 1,000,000: 
1940, 12.7; 1941, 15.2; 1942, 14.2; 1943, 13.8 ; 1944, 
figures unknown; it is estimated that since birth 
rate decreased and infant mortality increased, 
the figure is lower than that of the previous year. 
D. Transportation and Communications 
1. Transportation and shipping.-The volume of 
available shipping space was sharply reduced and 
at present comes to a total of 1,000,000 tons. 
Transportation is faced with insurmountable 
difficulties because of fuel shortages, mounting 
fury of enemy attacks on our lines of communi-
cations, and insufficient manpower in cargo 
handling. 
The question of whether or not we can maintain 
communication with the continent will greatly 
depend upon the results of the Okinawa campaign. 
If the campaign turns to our disadvantage, we 
cannot hope to maintain planned communication 
after June. For the same reason, the cargo-
carrying capacity of vessels will drastically 
decrease. 
NOTES 
Shipping 
Gross tons 
December 194L _________________________ __ 5, 500, ooo· 
December 1942 ___ __ ______________________ _ 4, 600,000 
December 1943_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 3, 700, 000 
July 1944 ____ ______________ ------- ----- --- 3, 100,000 
April 1945_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1, 250, 000 
Actual losses 
Percent 
Previous average ______________________ _________ 7- 10 
This year____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 23 
2. Transportation and railways .- Transport 
capacity of the railways will drop to half that of 
the previous year due to the intensified enemy air 
attack and our inability to maintain construction 
and repairs on an efficient level. It is feared that 
railway transportation will become confined to 
local areas, especially after the middle of this year. 
Shuttle transports (trucks, wagons, etc.) and 
cargo handling have become the bottleneck of 
land and sea transportation, because of the 
scarcity of fuel and labor. 
N OTE.S 
Railway transport capacity 
'l'ons 
1941_ ______ __ _____ ________________ _____ 150,000,000 
1942- -- --- ------ ------- - ---------- - ---- 160, 000, 000 
1943_- ------ -- - ----------------------- - 180, 000, 000 
1944 ____ __ ___ ___ __ _______ __________ ____ 19~ 00~000 
1945- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I 90, 000, 000 
1 Projected. 
3. Communications.- Maintenance of commu-
nication will be exceedingly difficult after the 
middle of this year, because of enemy air-raid 
damage and shortages of materials and personnel. 
E. Material Resources 
1. Steel.- Shipping of iron ore has become 
difficult. The total production is about one-fourth 
that of the same period of the previous year. 
Construction of steel ships cannot be expected 
after the mid year. Even a shift to the use of 
existing materials would mean overcoming numer-
ous obstacles before the plan could be executed. 
NoTEs 
Steel production 
Tons 
194 L _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 4, 200, 000 
1942 ____________ __ ___________________ ____ ~ 10~ 000 
1943- - - - - - - - - - - _·- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4, 200, 000 
1944 ___ __________ ___ _____________________ ~ 70~000 
1945_ ----------- - --- ---- - ---------------- 1 270, 000 
1 Projected for first quarter. 
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2. Ooal.- Accompanying the increasing severity 
of air raids and reduction in transport capacity 
and production, there is a strong possibility that 
a considerable portion of the various industrial 
areas will have to suspend operation for lack of 
coal. · 
3. Industrial salts.- Shipping from the conti-
nent has decreased and production of chemicals, 
which is dependent on soda, is falling off at an 
alarming rate. After the middle of this year, we 
will be confronted with a shortage of basic salts. 
For this reason, not only will there be difficulty 
in producing light metals and synthetic oil, but 
also in producing explosives. 
NOTES 
In the first quarter of 1945, the objective was to obtain 
46,000 tons, but the actual result was approximately 40 
percent. 
Aluminum production 
1941 _____ _________ ____ __________ __ ____ ____ _ 
1942 _________________ _____________________ _ 
1943 ___________________________ , ----------
1944 _____ __ _______________________________ _ 
1945 ___ __________ __________ ------------ - --
I Projected for firs t quart~r. 
Ton• 
73,000 
110, coo 
140,0CO 
110,000 
1 9, 000 
4. Liquid fuel.- Hereafter Japan, Manchuria, 
and China will have to depend upon their own 
sources for fuel oil. With oil reserves on the 
verge of exhaustion and the delay in plans for 
increased output of oil, we are faced with an 
extreme shortage of aviation fuel. This, of course, 
will have a serious effect on the planning of future 
operations, especially after the mid-year. 
Year 
1941.. ....... 1 1942 _________ 
1943 _________ 
1944 .. ...... . 
1945 ......... 
NOTES 
[U ni t: 1,000 kl.] 
P roduct ion Storage 
Various 
t y pes of 1 Crude oil I Period fuel proc-
essed 
3, 470 I 1, 570 I Apri1194L. _______ I 3, 020 1, 2fi6 April1942 ___ ____ __ 
3. 460 1, 969 April 1943 ......... 
2, 0.53 734 April1944 ......... 
1,362 330 April1945 ....... .. 
Various 
types of 1 Crude oil fuel proc-
essed 
4, 4571 3, 562 4, 115 1, 963 
2, 940 1, 220 
1, 822 558 
752 779 
5. Modern weapons with aircraft as a nucleus.-
It is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain 
production of aircraft due to the ever increasing 
tempo of air raids, the destruction of transporta-
tion systems and production facilities, and the 
lack of raw materials and fuels. 
NoTES 
PToduction of aircraft 
1944, monthly production __ ____ " _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 2, 230 
1945, ApriL _____ __ ___ ____________________ __ __ 1, 800 
1945, May ________ _______ ___________ ___ c _ _ _ _ _ _ 1, 600 
F. National Living Conditions 
1. Foodstuffs.- The food situation has grown 
worse and a crisis will be reached at the end of 
this year. The people will have to get along on an 
absolute minimum of rice and salt required for 
subsistence considering the severity of air raids, 
difficulties in transportation, and the appearance 
of starvation conditions in the isolated sections of 
the nation. It is apparent that the food situation 
will become further aggravated this year. 
2. Living conditions.- From now on prices will 
rise sharply bringing on inflation which will 
seriously undermine the wartime economy. 
NoTEs 
Anticipated supply and demand of rice for 1945 (estimate 
made 1- 10 June) 
[TN: 1 koku=4.96 bushels] 
Koku 
(a) Estimated supply, Japan proper_ _______ 77, 165, 000 
(b) Estimated demand _____ ____ ___________ 84,258,000 
(c) Estimated imports from Manchuria and 
ICorea ______________________ _________ 4, 250,000 
(It will become increasingly difficult to realize this figure 
depending upon air raids.) 
Deficiencies will be alleviated with military rice and by 
placing restrictions on rice distribution. 
APPENDIX A-3. COMPARISON OF MILI-
TARY STRENGTH OF JAPAN AND THE 
UNITED STATES AT THE OUTBREAK 
OF HOSTILITIES 
(Compiled from memory by innividuals concerned at that 
time) 
A. Main Strength of the Imperial Navy in 
December 1941 
1. Surface strength: 
Battleships_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 0 
Aircraft carriers _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 9 
Heavy cruisers: 
First class_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 8 
Second class_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 10 
Light cruisers _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 16 
Destroyers __ _______ _______ __ _______ 110 
Submarines_ ______________________ 64 
Seaplane tenders__ ____ _____________ 1 5 
Submarine tenders_ ________ ____ ____ 3 
2. Air strength: 
Fighter planes ___ ________________ __ 500 
Carrier-based born hers__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 180 
Carrier-based attack planes_ _____ ___ 300 
Land-attack planes _____________ ___ 350 
Reconnaissance seaplanes____ _______ 340 
Flying boats____ _____ _______ _____ _ 15 
1 Including 2 converted seaplane tenders. 
B. Japanese Navy Estimates of Allied Naval Strength at Beginning of the War 
Table I.-Estimate of Disposition of Main Surface Forces 
United States 
Hawaii areal Philippines! We;t_coast, 
area Umted 
States 
.Aleutian 
area 
.Atlantic 
area 
Malay area 
Bnti; h 
Indian 
OC<'an area 
(Including I Au,trruian 
East and area 
Southeast 
Afrira) 
Stren~th 
available 
for transfer 
to Far Ea.' t 
Dutch 
--------.1 I I I I I ·I I 1---1---
Battleships ___ _____ ________ ___ __ 8 
.Air1•raft carriers .. ____________ __ 3 
Com-et ted aircraft carriers ______ ------------
Heavy cruisers___ __ ___ _________ 12 
Light cruisers__ ______ __ __ ______ 5 
Small cruiser$___________ _______ 2 
f\ostroyers __ ______ ______ _______ • 30 
Submarines__ ____________ ______ (') 
Othe<". __ ------------ ---------- (') 
Sub tender·-·---- ____ ______ _ 
Seaplane tend~r _______ ____ _ 
Others __ ----- ------- ______ _ 
I Pin.• 4 (!) . 'No reserve strength available for some time. 
1. Total United States strength: 
Battleships __ __ ------------------- ---- ---------------------- --- 13 
Aircraft carriers __ ------------------------ --- ------------------- 6 
Converted aircraft carriers.- ------------------------ --------- -- 2 
Henvy cruisers: 
First cla.<;s ___ --------------- ----- ------ ---------- ------ ----- 18 
Second class __ _ ------------------------- ------------------- 9 Light cruisers. ___ ______________________________________________ 10 
Destroyers __________________________________________ ------_____ 250 
Submarines (excusive of coastal subs)_________________________ 35 
• Approximately. • Several. 
Non~ 
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2. Estimated .Additions During War: 
(a) United States: 
Year ending Dec. 1942-1 battleship, 2 aircraft carriers. 
Year ending Dee. 1943-4 battleships. 2 airrraft carriers. 
(b) Enl!land: No increase of strength in Fnr Ea.qt until war situntion 
in Enroll<' improrcs. 
(c) One cruiser, 1 destroyer, and several subm!U"ines moved to England 
from Holland and under construction may be added to strength 
in Far East by mid-1942. 
/ 
t 
Table 2.-Estimates of Disposition of Allied Air Strength 
Hawaii 
area 
[TN: All figures are approximate] 
United States 
Wake- !Philippines 
Midway area 
Aleutian 
area 
Strength 
available 
for transfer 
to Far 
East 
Malay 
area 
British 
Burma 
area 
India 
area Australia 
Dutch 
I 1----1 1----1---
Fighter planes _____________ ____ _ 
Large planes (4 engines) _______ _ 
Medium planes (2 engines) ___ _ 
Small attack planes __________ _ 
Reconnaissance and observa-
tion planes __________________ _ 
Reconnaissance seaplanes _____ _ 
Flying boats __ _ 
!Wake 
•Midway 
NOTES 
2. Estimates of potential United States aircraft p1·ouuctiou: 
Estimated planes on hand, December 1941: 
80 
'JO 
I. Estimated increase in United States first-liue plaues: 
(a) Army and Navy first-line planes: 
December: Army------- ----- - ------ - -- -- ----- --- ------- --- ------ - ---_ 40, QOO 
194L. __ --------------------------------- - ------------- 2, 600 
1942.--------- --- -------------------------------------- 7, 100 
1943_-- ---------- --- - --- --- -- - --- -- -- --- --------- -- ----- 16, 200 (b) Fighter planes: 
December: 
194L. _ ---- ---------- -- ---- ---- -- --- ----- ----- -- ------- 900 
1942.---- --------------------- --- ---------------------- 2, 660 
1943_--- ·------------------------- - ----- -- ------ - --· - -- 5, 480 (c) 4-engine bombers: 
December: 
194L .. -------------- -- -------------------------------- 100 
1942.- ---- ----------- -- --- ------ ---- -- ----- ---- ---- -- --- 300 
1943.- - --- -- - ------- --- --- --- --- --- ----- -------- - --- --- 2, 690 
Navy----- -- -- --- -- --.--- --- -- -- -------- -- -------·- --- -- -- 30,000 
TotaL _- ------------------------------------------- _____ 70,000 Estimated planes on hand, December 1943 ____ __ __ _______ ____ 120, 000 
Estimated production, 194L. ----- -- --------- ---------- --- - __ 19,300 
Estimated production, 1942.-------- ------------------- -- - _ __ 47,000 
Estimated production, 1943. _ -- --- ------------- ------------ -- 85,000 
APPENDIX A-4. A COMPARISON OF 
(ESTIMATED) JAPANESE AND AMERI-
CAN MILITARY RESOURCES AT THE 
END OF THE WAR 
A. Estimated A merican Military Resources 
N ear the End of the War 
1. Main Na·oal Forces (l!JJ,.5): 
Type of ship End of End of July August 
--
Aircraft carriers 25/28 26/28 
Escort carriers __ 70/85 74/89 
Battleships ____ 23/23 I 24/24 
Cruisers ____ ___ -I 35/64 I 36/64 
Destroyers _____ _ ! 244/324 I 251/331 
Notes 
l. This table is based on figure~ pub-
lished in the United States at the 
end of April, modified by the re-
sults achieved by the OP!'ration for 
defense of Okinawa. (The last 
figure represents total, the first 
represents the number assigned to 
operations against Japan.) 
2. Of ships and vessels badly damaged 
in the operation for the defense of 
Okinawa, about half were made 
operational during the period from 
February to March, while the 
other half were rendered opera-
tional from March to April. 
3. New aircraft carriers became opera-
tional as follows: Antietam, end of 
June, Tarawa, end of July, and 
Bo1·er, end of August. rrhe Sara· 
toga and RangfT used in training, 
are not included. 
4. Escort carriers transferred to Eng-
land and those lost prior to the 
Okinawa operation are included in 
figures for total escort carriers. 
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2. Air Forces (191,.5): 
Area End of I End or I End or Area End of End of I End or July August September July August September 
---- --------·------------- ·-----1 1----
Northern area: New Guinea-Australia Area-Contd. Alaska ____________________________ _ 400 400 400 Australia ______________ _____ _______ 250 250 250 Aleutians ____ ___ _____ ____ __ ___ ____ _ 300 300 300 South Pacific: 
Ellis-Gilberts-Samoa Area ________ _ 150 150 150 Solomon Islands __ ______________ ___ 200 200 200 Marshalls ___ ___ _______ ____ ____ ----- 200 200 200 New Caledonia: Espiritu Santo._. 300 300 :mo Marianas _____________________ __ __ _ 1,000 1,000 1,000 Fiji__ ________________________ ______ 100 100 100 
Central Pacific: New Zealand ________ ______________ 100 100 100 
250 250 250 India-Burma '£heater ________________ __ I, .100 2, 000 2,000 
500 500 500 China: 
Pcleliu; UlithL --------- --- --- ____ _ Iwo Jima _________________________ _ 
900 1. 200 1,500 American Air Force _______________ 700 800 800 
200 200 200 American-Chinese Air Force _______ 150 150 150 
3,100 4,100 5,100 India-China transport planes ___ _______ 400 400 400 
f>OO G50 870 Fleet Air Forces _________________ ______ 3, 700 3.800 3,SOO 
HawaiL _ ------------------- ______ _ 
Transport planes .--- -- -- ---- ------(Philippine Islands) -------- --- ___ _ 
Ryukyu Islands (Nansei Shoto) _______ _ 
New Guinea-Australia Area: Eastern New Guinea ____ ___ ___ ___ _ 300 300 300 Totals ___________________________ Hi.OOO 17, S50 Hl,:l7!l 
Western New Guinea _______ ______ _ 000 GOO ()()0 
NoTE.-It is anticipatert that some of the forces now in the European ~rheater of Occupation will make their appearancP in thufil' thpat,~rs f'tn rt.in~ 
nbont the end of July. 
Supplementary Table (on Planes (1945)) 
End or Jul y End of August End of Sppt. 
~----------------1--------------------l-----------------l----------------------
Marianas (Islands) area_ 
Iwo 
Ryukyu Islands (Nansei Shoto) __ _ _ 
Philippines arcn __ ---- ------- ____ ___ _ 
B-29s. _______________ ________ ___ 850 
Others. ________________________ -------
TotaL ------------------------- 1, 000 
B- 29s. __ ---------------· _______ 50 B-24s . _ __ _________ ______ _ ___ _ __ !50 
P -5Is . _ ----------------- -----·- 250 
P - 61s . _________ ---------------- 30 
Others. __ ---------------------- 10 
TotaL -------- ----------------- 500 
P-47s, P-51s and P--61s _________ 300 
Carrier planes -------------- --- 100 B-24s_ __________________________ 150 
PVs. _________ ---------- _______ 30 
PBYs .. ------------- ----------- 40 
TotaL - -- --------------------- - GOO [sic] 
ll'ight.rt'.S _______________________ 1. 500 
Bomhrr5 (i ncludin~ 300 B-29s, 
R-17s, cl.c, an increase of 70 
B-21s) ____ ------------- ____ _ 1, 000 
Others._ ---------------------- 50 
'.l'otnl _______ . ______ _ ______ 2. MO 
3. Groundforces (191,.5): 
E nd or End or 
July August Branch or Arm 
-----
Army: 
53/90 70/90 
7/22 10/22 
3/ 10 4/ 10 
1/2 1/2 
Infantry divisions _____ _______ _ 
Armored divisions __________ _ 
Airborne 'divisions _________ _ 
Cavalry divisions ________ ._ 
------
64/ 134 85/134 
7/10 8/10 
------
71/144 93/144 
NOTES 
a. The figures in this table are based on the following estimates: 
(1) Since May, 2 divisions per month have been sent from the United 
States to participate in operations against Japan. 
(2) About one-hall of the approximately 60 divisions assigned to the western 
European Theater or Operations have been redeployed against Japan, as 
shown below: 
Military 
strength 
(number or 
divisions) 
Departed Euro-
pean Theater 
of Operations 
Arrived Philip-
pine Islands 
area 
Ready for opera-
tions 
(I) About 10 _____ 1 Middle to end of I End of July _____ l End of August. 
May. (2) About20 _____ June ____ __ _______ End of August ___ End of September. 
I 
Explanaiion: Equipment necessary lor redeployed forces and munitions 
reqwred for operations have been shipped to the Philippines area directly 
from the United States. 
(b) In the monthly figures in the main table above, the second figure repre-
sents the total number of divisions; the first represents the number assigned 
to operations against Japan. 
No change_ 
No change. Not known whether 
B- 29s are bein~ replaced with 
B-29s. 
P-47s, P-5ls and P--6ls ______ __ _ 
Carrier planes ___ ___ ___________ _ 
B-24s. _ -------------------------PVs __ 
PBYs __ 
TotaL 
300 
100 
200 
30 
40 
650 
[sic] 
Fighters . ______________________ 2, 000 
Bomber~ (including 400 B-29s; 
others same as prcced in.!! [sic]) ______ ______ _________ _____ 2. 000 
Others .. ----- --- ----- ---------- 100 
Total .----------------· _________ 4. 100 
No change. 
No change. 
P-47s, P -.1 1s and P--61s________ __ 400 
Carrier planes ___________________ 100 
B-24s. ___ ------------------- ____ 300 
PVs. __________ ----------------- 30 
PBYs ... _______ ------------------ 40 
TotaL ____ _______ ---- --- ---- ----- 870 
Fighters _______________________ _ 2, 500 
Fighters (including 500 B-29s; 
others same as preceding [sic])_ 2, 000 
Others .________________ ___ ______ 100 
TotaL . -·--------- _________ _ 5,100 
[siej 
B. j apanese Military Resources Near the End 
of the War 
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Japan's national power has grown progressively 
weaker with the loss of the Philippine Islands and 
Okinawa. All of our existing aircraft are being 
converted (to suicide planes). We are Goncen-
trating on the conversion (to defense of the home-
land) of a large part of the special submarine 
attack forces, which can be turned out with com-
parative ease. We plan to enhance our military 
resources through increased production of such 
items as twin-engine, twin-boom cargo planes 
(KI 115). Nevertheless, a certain amount of 
apprehension is still felt. 
1. Air forces: 
Fighters _____________________________________ _ 
Night fighters ________________________________ _ 
Small bombers ____ ~ _______________________ ___ _ 
Fighter bombers_____________________ 60 
Bombers. ______________ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 3,10 
Attack planes__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 266 
Medium bombers ____ ____________________ _____ _ 
Medium land-attack planes ___________ 197 
Land bombers ._____________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 155 
1, 170 
125 
636 
352 
~ 
Seaplanes __ _______ __________________ __ _______ _ 
Reconnaissance seaplanes _____________ 348 
F lying boats ___________________ ____ _ 10 
Seaplane bombers__ _________________ 40 
Single engine reconnaissance planes (MYRT) __ __ _ 
Other serviceable planes ____________ __________ _ _ 
398 
70 
75 
SubtotaL ________ _____ ________________ _ 2, 826 
Trainers: 
Medium trainers ______________ __ ____ 1, 900 
Shiragiku (reconnaissance trainers) ____ 318 
SubtotaL __________________________ ____ 2, 218 
Grand totaL _________ __________ ________ 5, 044 
2. Special attack .forcPs: 
Underwater demolition units ___________________ _ 
Surface suic ide boats (torpedo equipped) __ _____ _ _ 
Manual torpedoes _____________________ _______ _ 
Suicide boats (with bomb for explosion) _________ _ 
3. Ships and small craft: 
100 
300 
120 
2, 000 
Ships and small craft are not being stressed, 
because in view of the present state of the fuel 
supply, they can be used only as harbor anti-
aircraft defense ships. 
C. Enemy Losses Expected in the Operation fo r 
the Defense of the Homeland 
1. Estimate of the number of transports it 
would be possible to destroy in the event of an 
American attack on the homeland 
Estimate for the coming attack on the Kyushu 
Area in about September. 
Total number of transports, about ____ ______ _ 2, 000 
Probable number which would be sunk, about_ · 470 
(Basis for calculations omitted.) 
Thus, with about three-fourths able to make a 
landing, it would be difficult to defeat American 
plans through annihilation on the sea. 
2. If there should be successive delays in the 
attack, it would appear profitable from a purely 
tactical point of view to build up gradually the 
submarine special attack forces. It will be difficult 
to maintain om air power unless, despite intense 
air raids, pwduction levels can be maintained, and 
special measures devised to increase the pro-
duction of fuels so that a monthly output of about 
30,000 tons of aviation gasoline is assured. 
APPENDIX A- 5. MEMORANDUM O F 
K ON OYE CONVERSATION WITH 
HIROHITO, FEBRUARY 194 5. 
Early in February 1945 the Emperor initiated a 
number of private interviews with the elder states-
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men and his intimates to solicit their views on 
Japan's war situation and advice concerning the 
immediate future of the Empire. On 14 February 
1945 Prince Konoye had such an interview with 
the Emperor. In advance of that, Prince Konoye 
prepared a memorandum of his views which were 
verbally presented to the Emperor. An English 
translation of tho memorandum, prepared by T. 
Ushiba, Konoyc's long-time private secretary, is 
reproduced below. Copies of the translation and 
the original memorandum were given to the Survey 
at Karuizawa on 30 November 1945. 
Parts of the following translation arc not literal 
renditions of tho original Japanese but represent 
an accurate summary of salient points. The 
method of summarization employed by the trans-
lator, Mr. Ushiba, consists of omitting the less 
important examples cited by Konoye in support 
of conclusions. For instance, the examples of 
alleged Russian political infiltration in France, 
Jugoslavia, Belgium, etc. , have been omitted from 
the second paragraph. In all cases the conclusions 
remain intact. It is believed that tho omission of 
minor supporting arguments in a few instances 
does not detract sufficiently from the import of the 
document as a whole to justify a literal translation 
of the original in its entirety. 
* * * * * 
I think that there is no longer any doubt about 
our defeat. A defeat is, of course, a serious stain 
on our history, but we can accept it, so long as we 
can maintain our Tcnno system. Public opinion 
in America and Britain on the whole is not yet, at 
least, so bad as to demand a fundamental change 
in that system. ·what we have to fear, therefore, 
is not so much a defeat as a Communist revolution 
which might take place in the event of defeat. 
Conditions, internal as well as external, point to 
tho danger of such revolution. In the first 
place, there has been a notable ascendancy of 
Soviet Russia in world politics. In the light of 
her recent activities in Europe, we must judge 
that she has not abandoned the hope of bolshcvis-
ing the whole world. She is prosecuting such a 
policy vis a vis the Far East, and I fear interference 
in our domestic affairs. 
With regard to internal affairs, potentially 
dangerous factors include the rapid deterioration 
of the people's living conditions, increase in the 
voice of the laboring classes, rise of pro-Soviet 
feelings as enmity against America and Britain 
increases, attempts by an extremist group in the 
military to achieve radical changes in internal 
politics, activities of younger bureaucrats sympa-
thetic with that group, and disguised activities of 
the Communists behind both the military and 
bureaucrats. 
A majority of younger officers seem to think 
that the present form of the Japanese Government 
is compatible with Communism- a conception 
which, in any opinion, constitutes the basis of the 
radical thought of the military. The Communists 
are influencing them with the theory that, even 
under communism, Japan can maintain the Tenno 
system. I have now come to seriously doubt 
whether the whole series of events from the Man-
churian Incident to the present war have not been 
what they have purposefully planned. It is a 
well-known fact that they openly declared the aim 
of the Manchurian war was to achieve drastic 
reforms in domestic affairs. A central figure of 
theirs also declared that the longer the China 
Incident continued, the better, for otherwise, the 
intended reform would not be accomplished. Of 
course, the "reform" aimed at by the military may 
not necessarily be a Communist revolution, but 
the group of bureaucrats and civilians (both left 
and right) who are in a close collaboration with 
the military are definitely intending to bring about 
such a revolution. In the light of this conclusion, 
I now realize that I have, during the last ten years, 
· come across many events the meaning of which 
I did not then fully appreciate. Prime Minister 
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twice during that period, and over-eager to bring 
about national unity by accepting as much as 
possible of the doctrine advocated by those radical 
elements, I failed to perceive the true intentions 
hidden behind their arguments. I do not pretend 
to find any excuse for my short-sightedness, but 
I feel responsible for it. 
In the last few months, the slogan "Hundred 
Million Die Together" has become increasingly 
louder, seemingly among the right-wing people, 
but has its real basis in the activities of the Com-
munists. 
Under such circumstances, the longer we con-
tinue the war, the greater will be the danger of 
revolution. We should therefore stop the war as 
soon as possible. 
The greatest obstacle to ending the war is the 
existence of the military group which has been 
"propelling" the country into the present state 
ever since the Manchurian Incident-the group 
which, having already lost all hope of successfully 
concluding the war, nevertheless insists on its 
continuation in order to save face. If we try to 
stop the ·war abruptly, these military extremists 
together with both the right and left wings, might 
attempt anything-even a bloody internal revolt, 
and thereby nullify our efforts. The prerequisite 
to the conclusion of the war, therefore, is to wipe 
out the influence of these dangerous people and 
reform the Army and Navy. I must urge Your 
Majesty to make a serious decision to that end. 
APPENDIX B- BIOGRAPHIES OF JAPANESE LEADERS 
ANAMI, K orechika 
21 Feb 1887- Born, Oita prefecture. 
1907- Graduated, Military Academy. 
1918- Graduated, Army War College. 
- Army General Staff. 
1934- Director Military Affairs Bureau, 
War Ministry. 
Mar 1,938- Lt. General. 
Oct 1939- Vice Minister of War (under 
General Hata, Sunroku, in 
Abe and Yonai cabinets and 
under General Tojo, Hideki, 
in second Konoye and Tojo 
cabinets.) 
Apr 1941- Commander of an Army Corps on 
China Front. 
10 Apr 1943- General. 
1 Dec 1943- Commander of 2nd Army. 
26 Dec 1944- Inspector General of :Military 
Aviation; Supreme War Coun-
cilor and Director of Army 
Aviation Headquari:,ers. 
7 Apr 1945- War Minister in new Suzuki 
cabinet. 
30 Apr 1945- Adviser to the War Relief Associa-
tion. 
14 Aug 1945- Committed suicide with Japan's 
surrender and the fall of the 
Suzuki Cabinet. 
16 Aug 1945- Funeral services held at the War 
Ministry. 
HIGASHIKUNI, Naruhiko, Prince 
Career: 
3 Dec 1887- Born, Kyoto. 
Nov 1906- Established House of Higashikuni 
by order of the late Emperor 
Meiji. 
1908-Graduated from the Military 
Academy. 
1914- Graduated, · :my War College. 
1915- Conimander of Twenty-ninth In-
fantry Brigade; captain. 
Jul 1918- Major; battalion commander of 
Seventh Infantry Division. 
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Apr 1920- Lived in France, studied military 
tactics. 
1926- Honorary President of Japan 
Newspaper Association. 
Dec 1929- Major general staff officer, General 
Headquarters. 
1930- Commander of Fifth Infantry 
Brigade. 
Aug 1934- Lieutenant general; commander of 
Fourth Army Division. 
Dec 1935- Appointed Supreme War Coun-
cilor. 
Aug 1937- Chief of Military Aviation Depart-
ment. 
Apr 1938- Commander of Second Army; took 
part in China mainland fighting. 
Jan 1939- Supreme War Councilor. 
Aug 1939- General. 
1940- Again served in China; awarded 
the Order of the Golden Kite, 
First class. 
Dec 1941- Commander in Chief of Home 
Defense Headquarters and con-
currently Supreme War Coun-
cilor. 
Jul 1944-Resigned as Commander in Chief, 
Home Defense Headquarters. 
18 Aug 1945- Commaaded to form a new 
cabinet. 
5 Oct 1945- President of Diet structure investi-
gation council. 
Personal background: 
Higashikuni was an Imperial Prince who had 
been little more th m a figurehead in any of his 
army posts. Early in 1942 he was reported to 
have been associated with Prince Konoye in 
organizing the Showa Kenkyu Kai for the pur-
pose of overthrowing the TOJO regime and getting 
a peace with the United States while Jap m still 
had vast empire and before the United Sta.tes 
could rearm. In December 1944, it was again 
reported that he was active in organizing a party 
to overthrow the present regime, especially if the 
United States were to invade Japan proper. 
HIRANUMA, Kiichiro, Baron 
Career: 
28 Sep 1865-Born, Okayama prefecture. 
1888--Graduated, Tokyo Imperial Uni-
versity, Law school; entered 
Justice Ministry. 
1890- Judge of Tokyo Imperial Court. 
Judge and Department Director 
of Tokyo Court of Appeals 
Councilor of Justice Ministry. 
1905- Director of Civil and Criminal 
Affairs Bureau, Justice Minis-
try. 
1906- Went to Europe and America. 
1907- Received LL.D. 
Aug 1911-Vice Minister of Justice in second 
Saionji cabinet, serving under 
Justice Minister Matsuda. 
1912-Appointed Procurator General, 
Vice President of Privy Council. 
1918- Referred to as head of Tokyo 
Imperial University. 
1921-Appointed Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court. 
1923-1924-Minister of Justice in second 
Yamamoto cabinet. 
1924- Imperial nominee to the House of 
Peers. 
- Appointed to the Privy Council. 
-Lecturer at Tokyo Imperial Uni-
versity. 
-President of Kokuhonsha, a right-
ist organization. 
-President of Shuyodan, youth 
auxiliary of Kokuhonsha. 
1926-Appointed Vice President of the 
Privy Council. 
1927--Made a baron. 
- President of Nihon University. 
1936- Elected President of the Privy 
Council and resigned as presi-
dent of Kokuhonsha and Shuyo-
dan. 
Jan 1939- Premier, succeeding Konoye when 
it became clear that Konoye 
could not liquidate the China 
War. 
1940-Minister-without-portfolio, then 
Home Minister in second Ko-
noye cabinet. 
24 
Jul 1941-Appointed Minister-without-port-
folio in third Konoye cabinet. 
Mar 1941-Brought about drastic changes in 
the IRAA, and opposed totali-
tarian reform of Hoshino, N aoki 
the president of the Planning 
Board and forced him to resign 
in April 1941. 
Jul 1941-Forced out Matsuoka in Cabinet 
shake-up. 
Aug 1941-2 attempts on his life; on August 
14 wounded badly. 
Aug 1942-Went on official visit to Nanking. 
30 Jun 1945-Chairman of Council of Home 
Defense League. 
7 Aug 1945-President of Privy Council, suc-
ceeding Suzuki who became 
Premier. 
2 Dec 1945-0rdered arrested as a war criminal. 
Personal background: 
After World War I, Baron Hiranuma lent his 
support to various patriotic societies, the purpose 
of which was to combat Leftist tendencies among 
the students. Together with the leaders of these 
societies he formed a group to carry on national-
istic propaganda beyond the university. This 
group formed the basis for the Kokuhonsha. As 
Chairman of the House of Peers in 1924 and Vice 
President of the Privy Council in 1926, under his 
guidance this institution restrained even the 
insignificant attempts of the Kato and W akatsuki 
cabinets to introduce reforms. Finally in the 
conflict arising with the Wakatsuki cabinet over 
the question of granting aid to the banluupt Bank 
of Taiwan, Hiranuma secured the fall of the 
W akatsuki cabinet and the assumption of 'the 
premiership by the leader of the most reactionary 
wing of the Japanese bourgeoise, Gen. Giichi 
Tanaka. When he became Premier in 1939 his 
extreme reactionary views toned down. The 
attempts on his life in 1941 were instigated by 
Nakano, Seigo, of the Tohokai, in collaboration 
with certain members of the German Embassy. 
He was reported opposed to the war with the 
United States. Five members of his cabinet were 
in Koiso's cabinet. Koiso's Justice Minister 
Matsuzaka, Hiromasa, was a protege of Hiranuma. 
Until General Tojo took over full power in 
October 1941, Baron Hiranuma was unquestion-
ably the most powerful and influential figure in 
Japanese politics. As Minister-without-Portfolio 
in the second Konoye cabinet, he was in effect the 
de fact() Premier. Lt. General Heisuke Yanegawa 
(ret.), Justice Minister in the second Konoye 
Cabinet, was also one of Baron Hiranuma's 
proteges, and it was through him that Hiranuma 
attempted to effect drastic reforms in the IRAA to 
curb extreme reactionary activities. 
Ideologically, Baron Hiranuma was an arch-
fundamentalist. He did more than any other 
single individual to popularize nationalistic Shinto 
and the politico-religious concept of Kodo, or the 
Imperial way. His fundamentalism, however, did 
not keep pace with the more extreme forms of 
nationalism and reaction which developed. under 
the guidance of the Tojo clique, and by 1941 
Hiranuma found himself on the defensive. He 
:was particularly concerned that the new totali-
tari"an principles expressed by the Tojo group would 
tend toward a dictatorship in which the theoreti-
cally omnipotent position of the Emperor would 
be jeopardized. Hiranuma also strongly opposed 
the conclusion of the Axis alliance, partly out of 
fear that too close association with Germany would 
further encourage such totalitarian developments 
in Japan. 
HIROTA, Koki 
Career: 
1878-Born Kukuoka-ken. 
1905-Graduated, Tokyo Imperial Uni-
versity, politics; entered the 
foreign service, served in Peking. 
1909- Served in London. 
1918- First Secretary, Washington. 
1922-Subd.irector, Intelligence Bureau. 
1926- Minister to Netherlands. 
1932- Ambassador to Russia. 
1936--Foreign Millister in Saito and 
Okada cabinets. 
Mar 1936- Premier until February 1937. 
Jun 1937-Foreign Minister until May 1938 . 
. 5 Feb 1938-Spoke before the Diet about the 
progress of the China War and 
relations with the United States. 
24 Feb 1938-·Busy defending the National Mo-
bilization Bill. 
26 Feb 1938- "Japan plans to halt Naval Race." 
4 Mar 1938-"Sorry for America if she fortifies 
Hawaii", etc. 
5 Mar 1938- Urged abolition of capital ships. 
5 Mar 1938 - Said Japan would behead Chiang 
Kai-Shek. Said peace offers to 
Chiang bad been rejected. 
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Jun 1942-Appointed special emissary to 
Thailand. 
23 Oct 1943-Assisted in the organization of the 
Peace Society Heiwa Kai to 
promote friendly relations with 
the Southern Regions. 
14 Jan 1944- Attended a meeting sponsored by 
Tokama, Mitsuru; later was 
chairman for committee for 
funeral of Tokama. 
14 Sep 1945- Removed from list of Black 
Dragon members wanted for 
questioning. No explanation 
gtven. 
2 Dec 1945- 0rdered arrested as a war criminal. 
Personal Background: 
A libei·al, broad-minded, and able diplomat. 
It is believed that the Army was behind his 
appointment in replacing Uchida in 1933 in order 
to avert hostilities with Russia. Hirota was a 
protege of Tokama, Mitsuru; was also presiding 
officer at directors meeting of the Black Dragon 
Society. Stated that the war with the United 
States had best begin in December or February of 
1941. 
INOUE, Shigeyoshi, Admiral 
Career: 
1889- Born. 
1909- Graduated, Naval Academy. 
1910- Ensign. 
1921- Lieutenant commander. Gradu-
ated, Higher Naval College. 
1924- Military Affairs Bureau; Naval 
Technical Council. 
1927- Naval attache, Rome, Paris, and 
Berne. 
1929- Captain. 
- Shipbuilding and ordnance in-
spector, Technical Department; 
ordnance inspector, Aviation 
Department. 
1930-Instructor, Higher Naval College. 
1932- 1933- Chief, First Section, Military ft,f-
fairs Bureau; Naval Training 
College. 
- Commanding officer, BB Hiei . 
1935- Chief of staff, Yokosuka Naval 
District. 
15 Nov 1935- Rear admiral. · 
1936- Navy General Staff and Navy 
Department. 
15 Nov 1937-Director, Military Affairs Bureau; 
Board of Admirals. 
Oct 1939- Chief of staff, China Area Fleet. 
15 Nov 1939- Vice admiral. 
1940- Director, Naval Aviation Depart-
ment. 
Aug 1941- Commander in Chief, Second Fleet. 
1942- Director, Naval Academy. 
Nov 1942- Commanderin Chief, Fourth Fleet. 
5 Aug 1944- Succeeded as Director, Naval 
Academy, by Vice Admiral 
Okochi, Denshichi; Navy Vice 
Minister, succeeding Vice Ad-
miral Oka, Takazumi; Board of 
Admirals (Imperial Headquar-
ters). 
6 Nov 1944- Chief, Naval Technical Depart-
ment, relieving Vice Admiral 
Sugiyama, Rokuzo. 
18 Nov 1944- Relieved of above post by Vice 
Admiral Shibuya, Ryutaro. 
1 May 1945- Chief, Naval Aviation Headquar-
ters (concurrent) . 
15 May 1945- Admiral. Supreme War Counci-
lor. Succeeded as Navy Vice 
Minister by Vice Admiral Tada, 
Talmo : Succeeded as Command-
er in Chief, Naval Aviation 
Headquarters, by Vice Admiral 
Wada, Misao. 
15 Oct 1945- Relieved of posts in demobiliza-
tion of Navy personnel. 
KIDO, Koichi, Marquis 
Career: 
1889- Born, Yamaguchi Prefecture. 
1915- Graduated, Kyoto Imperial Uni-
versity (law and politics). 
1917- Inherited title. 
- Secretary, Emergency Industrial 
Inspection Bureau, Agricultural 
and Commerce Minister. 
- Councilor, Agriculture and Com-
merce Ministry. 
1917- Secretary, F~shery Bureau. 
- Chief, Industrial Section, Indus-
trial Bureau, Commerce and 
Industry Ministry. 
- Chief, Accounts and Documents 
Sections, Commerce and In-
dustry Ministry. 
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1917 - Chief, First Section, Emergency 
Industrial Rationing Bureau. 
1929- Delegate to Berlin International 
Parliamentary Trade Congress. 
1930- Chief Secretary to Lord Keeper of 
the Privy Seal. 
1937- Education Minister. 
- Director, Bureau of Peerage and 
Heraldry, Imperial Household. 
Ministry. 
1938- Concurrently, Welfare Minister. 
1939- Home Minister. 
-:-House of Peers. 
1940- Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. 
Jul 1944_:_Active in selecting Premier Koiso 
to succeed Tojo. 
Dec 1944- Reported to be one of group 
secretly plotting to overthrow 
present regime and to set up 
new government headed by 
Hih, Prince Higashikuni, N aru-
hiko, and to ask United States 
for peace terms. 
6 Dec 1945- 0rdered arrested as war criminal. 
Background: 
A member of the Tokyo aristocracy, he had long 
been associated politically with Prince Konoye, 
Fumimaro, and was backed by the latter and by 
the Army for the post of Lord Keeper of the Privy 
Seal, to replace Yuasa, Kurahei, whom the Army 
considered too liberal an adviser to the Emperor. 
KISHI, Shinsuke (Nobusuke) 
Career: 
Nov 1896- Born. 
1920- Graduated, Tokyo Imperial Uni-
versity (law). 
- Secretary, Industry Department, 
Industry Rationalization Unem-
ployment Problems Committee. 
-Director, Industry Bureau, Com-
merce and Industry Ministry. · 
1936- Director, Industry Bureau, Man-
chukuo Industry Department. 
1937-39-Vice Minister of Industry Depart-
ment, Manchukuo. 
-Director, Patent Bureau, Man-
chukuo. 
J 
" 
Mar 1939-Assistant director, General Affairs 
Board, State Council, Manchu-
kuo. 
- Returned to Japanese Govern-
ment to assume post as Vice 
Minister, Commerce and In-
dustry. 
1943- Relieved of post as Commerce and 
Industry Minister. Post as-
sumed concurrently by Premier 
Tojo. 
- Minister-without-Portfolio and 
Vice Minister of Commerce and 
Industry. 
Nov 1944-Member, House of Representa-
tives. 
16 Sep 1945-Taken into custody as a war crim-
-inal. 
Kishi and Lt. General Teiichi Suzuki drafted 
the Munitions Company Act for the Tojo cabinet, 
which later caused much friction between Army 
and industrialists. Kishi was a civilian member 
of the so-called Manchurian clique and his political 
and economic ideas were to a good extent shaped 
by experiences with state planning under the 
aegis of the Kwantung Army. 
K OISO, Kunikai, General 
Career: 
Mar 1880-Born, Y amagata-ken. 
190 1- Second lieutenant. 
1901-31-Commander of Fifty-First Infan-
try Regiment; Director of Gen-
eral Affairs Section, A v1ation 
Headquarters; member of Gen-
eral Staff. 
1931- Director of Military Affairs Bureau 
during the Manchurian Inci-
dent; War Vice Minister. 
1932- Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army. 
1934- Commander of Fifth Division 
(Hiroshima). 
1935- ·Commander of Korean Army. 
Nov 1937- General, attached to Army Gen-
eral Staff. 
1938- Retired. 
7 Apr 1939- Assumed office of Overseas Minis-
ter, relieving Hatta, ' Yoshiaki. 
Held this post through Hira-
numa and Y onai cabinets. 
2 7 
29 May 1942- Governor General of Korea. 
19 J ul 1944- Retired as Governor General, Ko-
rea, in order to accept job of 
forming new cabinet. 
22 Jul 1944- Formed new cabinet with himself 
as Premier. 
10 Feb 1945---Reorganized his cabinet as the 
result of pressure from the Im-
perial Rule Assistance Associa-
tion and other malcontent ele-
ments, and made changes which 
represented a personal loss rath-
er than a change of great 
political significance. 
19 Feb 1945- Chairman of wartime Price Inves-
tigation Committee. 
2 Apr 1945- Commander in Chief of Volunteer 
Corps which was to be estab-
lished on a national basis under 
a central headquarters. 
5 Apr 1945-Resigned with entire cabinet the 
same day Russia renounced 
Neutrality Pact with Japan. 
Emperor immediately named 
Suzuki to form a new cabinet. 
19 Nov 1945- 0rdered arrested as a war crim-
inal. 
Personal background: 
Strongly pro-Axis and anti-Russian. At the 
time of his appointment as overseas minister in 
1939, his outspoken and positive views were 
expected to bring an immediate strengthening of 
Japan's continental policy. An intimation of hi:; 
character may be obtained h·om his nickname 
"the Tiger of Korea" and the fact that he had 
claimed to be a staunch believer that all problems 
could be solved by the "Imperial Way". He 
was one of the most out-spoken of the politically 
minded in the Army; was closely associated with 
the single party movement; and had worked in 
the Kokuhonsha with Baron Hiranuma. Lieut-
enant General Kimura, Haruo, stated that Koiso 
gave the order to invade French Indochina. He 
was alleged also to have been a member of the 
Black Dragon Society. He was a member of the 
Japanese Imperial Headquarters while he was 
Premier in order to have status equal to that of 
the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff, an unpre~ 
cedented action sanctioned by Hirohito. Other 
evidence indicates that there was considerable 
personal friction between Koiso and Tojo. 
K ON OYE, Fumimaro, Prince 
Career: 
1891-Born. 
1904-Succeeded to title. 
1916- House of Peers. 
1917-Graduated, Kyoto Imperial Uni-
versity (la r' political science). 
1918- Entered Home Ministry as non-
regular staff member, stationed 
in Europe. 
1919- Delegate to Paris Peace Confer-
ence, in suite of Prince Saionji. 
1924- Councilor, Bureau of Peerage and 
Heraldry. 
1926- Cultural Investigation Commit-
tee. 
- Lord in waiting of the Musk Hall. 
1927- Chief Commissioner of the Impe-
rial Coronation; charged with 
program of the accession to the 
throne of the present Emperor. 
1931- 1933- Vice President, House of Peers. 
1933- President, House of Peers. 
· 1933- 0ne of the founders of Greater 
Asia Society. 
1934- Travelled to the United States to 
promote friendly relations. 
Jun 19371 p . F' K C b' Jan 1939f- rem1er, rrst onoye a met. 
Jan 1939} p .d p . C .1 Jun 1940 - res1 ent, nvy ounc1 . 
Jan 1939} l\,r· . . h p f 1. H. Aug 1939 - ·.umster-w1t. out- ort ow, lra-
Jul1940l nu~a Cabmet. . 
Jul 1941f-Prem1er, second Konoye cabmet. 
Jul 1941} p . Tl. d K b' Oct 1941 - rem1er, 11r onoye ca met. 
1940- Founded Imperial Rule Assistance 
Association. 
1942-Active in organization and work 
of Showa Kenkyu Kai. · 
1943- Adviser to IRAA. 
1944- Representative of the Koa Dantai 
Rengokai in the Greater East 
Asia Ministry. 
- Representative of the Daitoa Rem-
meL 
Jul 1944- Active in organization of Koiso 
cabinet. 
Apr 1945- Active in organization of Suzuki 
cabinet. 
16 Aug 1945-- Named Minister-without-Portfolio 
in Higashikuni cabinet. 
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9 Oct 1945- Named adviser to the Lord Keeper 
of the Privy Seal. 
23 Nov 1945- Relieved as special adviser to Lord 
Privy Seal after he submitted 
recommendations revising the 
Japanese constitution. 
Dec 1945- Committed suicide. 
Konoye has been labeled at various times 
radical, moderate, totalitarian. He was president 
of the Far East, Siam, Indo-China, Japan-Nei, 
and South Seas Associations, and would seem to 
have been fundamentally nationalistic, whatever 
his temporary political attitude. He was con-
sidered friendly to the United States, and sent his 
son to Princeton. 
In 1942, he was active in the organization and 
work of Showa Kenyu Kai, an anti-Tojo organiza-
tion, and in late 1944 he was reported to be one of 
a group secretly planning the overthrow of the 
present regime in favor of a new government 
headed by Prince Higashikuni, N aruhiko, should 
Japan proper be invaded by the United States. 
This move included the possibility of asking the 
United States for peace terms. 
Prince Konoye also enjoyed close connection 
with some of the more extreme patriotic societies. 
This was probably a heritage of his father's close 
personal friendship with the late Mitsuru Toyama, 
head or sponsor of some of the most violent 
societies, including the famous Black Dragon 
Society. Although his father, Prince Atsumaro 
Konoye, died in his 40's, he had promise of be-
coming an outstanding political figure and may 
be regarded as one of the first "nationalistic 
liberals" in Japanese politics. 
MATSUDAIRA, Tsuneo 
Career: 
Apr 1877- Born, Tokyo. 
1902-Graduated, Tokyo Imperial Uni-
versity (political science.) At-
tached to Legation in Pekmg. 
1907- Third Secretary, Embassy in Lon-
don and Paris. 
. 1910- Second Embassy Secretary. 
- Second Secretary, Legation m 
Peking. 
1914-Consul General, Tientsin. 
1918-Councilor, Embassy in Washing-
ton, D. C. 
1914-1920-Chief Diplomatic Commission, 
Siberian Expeditionary Force. 
Sep .1923-Vice Foreign Minister. 
-Concurrently Director Intelligence 
Department. 
1924-Ambassador to Washington. 
1929-1930-Delegate to Tenth and Eleventh 
League of Nations Conferences, 
Geneva. 
1929-Delegate to London Naval Con-
ference. 
1931-Delegate, Geneva Disarmament 
Conference. 
1932-Delegate to League of Nations 
Conference at Geneva. 
until 1936-Ambassador to Court of St. 
James, London. 
Mar 1936-Minister of Imperial Household. 
30 Apr 1945-Adviser to Sensai Engokai (War-
time Relief Association). 
4 Jun 1945-Resigned as Imperial Household 
Minister because of bombing of 
Palace: 
Matsudaira was the very epitome of the so-
called "liberal, pro-American, pro-British" clique 
which allegedly surrounded the Throne and which 
was the prime target of the young officers and 
other patriotic assassins. Matsudaira's daughter 
married Prince Chichibu, the present Emperor's 
eldest brother. 
OIKAW A, Koshiro, Admiral 
Career: 
1883- Born, Iwate prefecture. 
1903- Graduated Naval Academy. 
1913- Higher Naval College. 
1915- Graduated Higher Naval College; 
aide to Grown Prince, served as 
aide-de-camp for 7 years. 
1919- Commander. 
1922- Commanding officer, Fourteenth 
Destroyer Division. 
1923- Captain. 
1924- Commanding officer, CL Tama. 
- Navy General Staff and Naval 
Training College. 
1926- Chief instructor and discipline 
officer, Naval Academy. 
1928- Rear Admiral, Chief of Staff, 
Kure Naval District. 
Jul 1932- Aide to special inspector ap-
pointed by Emperor. 
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Nov 1932-Commanding Officer, First Air 
Flotilla of First Fleet. 
15 Nov 1933-Vice Admiral. 
Dec 1935- Commander in Chief, Third Fleet. 
Dec 1936- Director, Naval Aviation De-
partment. 
Apr 1938- Commander in Chief, Third Fleet. 
15 Nov 1939- Admiral. Commander in Chief, 
Yokosuka Naval District. 
1 Jan 1940- Commander in Chief, China Area 
Fleet. 
Sept 1940- Navy Minister. 
20 Oct 1941- Supreme War Councilor. 
Nov 1942- Director, Higher Naval College. 
1943- Supreme War Councilor. 
17 Nov 1943- Reported to be Commander in 
Chief, Grand Surface Escort. 
9 Aug 1944- Chief, Navy General Staff, re-
lieving Admiral Shimada, Shi-
getaro. 
29 May 1945- Supreme War Councilor; suc-
ceeded as Chief, Navy General 
Staff by Admiral Soemu 
Toyoda. 
Personal Background: 
He was supposed to have had influence with the 
Emperor due to a close personal connection during 
Emperor's adolescence. Considered to be one of 
ablest Japanese naval officers. A strong pro-
ponent of southward expansion, but tende'd to 
favor diplomatic and covert naval pressure in 
place of overt mi'litary action. 
OKADA, Keisuke, Admiral (retired) 
Career: 
Jan 1867- Born, Fukui prefecture. 
- Graduate, Naval Staff College. 
- Director, Torpedo School. 
- Commander, 2nd Squadron. 
- Commanding Officer, 1st and 3rd 
Torpedo Squadron. 
- Director, Personnel Bureau, Navy 
Ministry. 
- Director, Sasebo Na:val Arsenal. 
- Director, Construction Bureau, 
Navy Ministry. 
- Chief, Naval Construction Head-
quarters. 
- Vice Minister, Navy. 
- Supreme War Councilor. 
-Commander in Chief; First and 
Combined Fleets. 
-Same, Y okosuka ~a val Station. 
1927-Navy Minister. 
1932-34-Same, SAITO cabinet. 
1934-36-Premier. 
Personal background: 
Okada was reported in December 1944 to be 
one of a group secretly organizing a party to over-
throw the regime, set up a new government headed 
by Prince Higashikuni, and ask the United States 
for peace terms. Hisatsune Sakomizu married 
Okada's second daughter, Manki. In April 1945 
Sakomizu became chief cabinet secretary in the 
SUZUKI cabinet. As a retired premier, or Jushin, 
_ Okada wielded considerable political influence. 
Today he is unquestionably one of the Emperor's 
closest personal advisers. 
OZAWA, Jizaburo, Admiral 
Career: 
1886- Born. 
1909- Graduated, Naval Academy. 
1 Jan 1935- Cominanding officer of CA Maya. 
1 Jan 1936- Cohunanding officer of BB Haruna. 
1 Dec 1936- Rear admiral. 
1 Jan 1937- Instructor, Higher Naval College. 
1 Jan 1939- Director, Torpedo School; Naval 
Training College. 
1 Jan 1940- Commanding officer, First Air 
Flotilla. 
Nov 1940- Vice admiral. 
Sep 1941- Director, Higher Naval College. 
2 Jan 1942- Commander in Chief, First South-
e1·n Expeditionary Fleet. 
14 Jul 1942- Navy General Staff. 
11 Dec 1942- Commander in Chief, Third Fleet. 
1 Mar 1944- Commander in Chief, First Mobile 
Fleet; Commander in Chief, 
Third Fleet. 
18 Nov 1944-Vice Chief, Navy General Staff; 
Director, Higher Naval College. 
29 May 1945- Commander in Chief, Combined 
Fleet. 
_:_Commander in Chief, Over-all 
Naval Command. 
- Commander, Naval Escort Com-
mand. 
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SAKOMIZU, Hi.satsune 
Career: 
Aug 1902- Born, Kagoshima prefectme. 
1926- Graduate, Tokyo Imperial Univer-
sity (law). 
- Joined Finance Ministry. 
1930- Financial Attache, New York . 
1934-36- Private secretary to Premier Okada. 
- Director, Financial Planning Sec-
tion. 
- Chief, General Affairs Bureau, 
Financial Minis try. 
- Staff, Cabinet Planning Board 
under Tojo and Koiso . 
- Chief cabinet secretary, Suzuki 
cabinet. 
1946- Candidate for Diet from Kago-
shima. 
Personal Background: 
Sakomizu is the son-in-law of former Premier 
Okada: This important family connection gave 
him considerable political influence despite his age . 
SATO, Naotake 
Career: 
30 Oct 1882- Born, Osaka. 
1904- Graduate, Tokyo Higher Com-
mercial School. 
- Entered Foreign Service. 
1906- Attache, Embassy in St. Peters-
burg. 
1914- Consul-General, Harbin. 
1921- Minister to Poland. 
1927-Director, Japanese Office, League 
of N atiors, Paris. 
1930- Ambassador to Belgium. 
1933~1937-Ambassador to France. 
Mar-Jun 1937- Foreign Minister. 
Sep- Oct 1938- Advisor, Foreign Office. 
Aug 1943- Ambassador to Moscow. 
8 Aug 1943- Received notification of Russia's 
declaration of war. 
- Interned in the Embassy at 
Moscow. 
Sato favored friendly relations with Russia, was 
considered liberal and an internationalist and was 
reported to have stated in 1942 that the war be-
tween Japan and the United States was a regret-
table mistake, but "we cannot stop now." 
SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru 
Oa.reer: 
29 Jul 1887-Born, Oita prt>fecture. 
1911- Graduate, Tokyo Imperial Uni-
versity (law). 
- Entered Foreign Service. 
1911 - Germany. 
1914- England. 
1916- Third Secretary, London. 
1918- Consul in Poland. 
1919 - Germany. 
1920- Secretary, Foreign Office. 
1923- 24 - Chief, First Secretary, Treaty 
Bureau. 
1925- First Secretary, China. 
1927 - Counsellor, Germany. 
1929- 30 - Consul-General, Shanghai and 
Embassy secretary. 
1931- Minister to China. 
1933- Vice Foreign Minister. 
1933- 34- Chief, Research Bureau, Foreign 
Office. 
1936- Ambassador to Russia. 
1938- Ambassador to England. 
1939- First Ambassador to Nanking 
Government. 
1941- Named Foreign Minister after fall 
of Konoye Cabinet. 
1943- Foreign Minister in Tojo Cabinet. 
27 Jul 1944- Foreign Minister, Koiso Cabinet. 
-GEA Minister. 
8 Apr 1945- Cabinet Minister privileges granted 
by Emperor. 
16 Aug 1945- Foreign Minister and GEA Min-
istry in Higashikuni Cabinet. 
18 Sep 194,15- Resigned his post as Foreign Min-
ister. 
SHIMADA, Shigetaro, Admiral 
Oa,reer: 
1883- Born, Tokyo. 
1904-Graduated, Naval Academy. 
1924- Captain, graduated from higher 
Naval College. 
-Naval attache, Rome; Navy Gen-
eral Staff. 
1925- Instructor, Higher Naval College. 
1927- Commanding officer, Seventh Sub 
Division. 
1928- Navy General Staff. 
-------
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1929- Commanding officer, CL Tama. 
- Commanding officer BB Hiei. 
30 Nov 1929- Rear Admiral. 
1930- Chief of Staff, Second Fleet. 
1931- Chief of Staff, Combined and First 
Fleets. 
1932-Director, Submarine school. 
- Chief of Staff, Third Fleet. 
1933- Chief, Third section, Navy Gen-
eral Staff; Naval Training Col-
lege. 
1934- Chief First section, Navy Gen-
eral Staff; Naval Training Col-
lege. 
15 Nov 1934- Vice Admiral. 
1936- Vice Chief, Navy General Staff. 
Dec 1937- Commander in Chief, Second Fleet. 
Nov 1938- Com.mander in Chief, Kure Naval 
District. 
1940- Comm.ander in Chief, China Area 
Fleet. 
Nov 1940- Adm.iral. 
1941- Commander in Chief, Yokosuka 
Naval District. 
16 Oct 1941- Navy Minister in Tojo cabinet. 
21 Feb 1944- Concurrently, Chief Navy General 
Staff, succeeding Admiral NO-
mura, Naokum.i. 
17 Jul 1944- Resigned as Navy Minister, suc-
ceeded by Admiral Nomura, 
Naokumi. 
2 Aug 1944- Relieved as Chief Navy General 
Staff by Admiral Oikawa, Ko-
shiro. 
- Supreme War Councillor. 
20 Jan 1945- Placed on reserve list at own re-
quest. 
13 Sep 1 945- Arrested as war criminal. 
SUZUKI, Kantaro, Admiral Baron 
Career: 
1867- Born, Chiba prefecture. 
1887- Graduated Naval Academy. 
1894- Lieutenant, commanding officer, 
Torpedo Boat No. 6, during 
Sino-Japanese War. 
1895- Sank two Chinese warships block-
aded in W eihaiwei. 
1896- Graduated Naval Staff College. 
31 Dec 
20 Feb 
31 Jul 
Jan 
1 Dec 
15 Apr 
22 Jan 
26 Feb 
Nov 
Jun 
10 Aug 
1898-Staff, Naval Affairs Bureau. 
-Staff, Naval Training Depart-
ment. 
-Instructor at Naval and Military 
Academy. 
1903- Sent to Germany and appointed 
to bring home Kasuga. 
1904 -Commanding officer, Kasuga and 
Fourth Destroyer Flotilla in 
Russo-Japanese War. 
1906-Instructor, Higher Naval College. 
1907 - Captain, commanding officer 
(OCL) Akashi and (OCL) Soya. 
1908 -Captain, Akashi and Soya. 
- Director, Naval Personnel Bureau. 
1911-Director, Torpedo School. 
1913- Rear Admiral. Commanding offi-
cer, Maizuru Torpedo Division. 
- Commander, Second Squadron. 
- Chief, Navy Personnel Bureau. 
1914- Vice-Minister of Navy in second 
Okuma cabinet. 
1916 - Director, Personnel Bureau. 
1917 - Vice Admiral. Commander m 
Chief, Training Squadron. 
1918- Director, Naval Academy. 
1919- Director, Naval Staff College. 
1921- Commander in Chief, Second and 
Third Squadrons and Kure 
Naval Station, First Squadron. 
1922- Commander in Chief, Fifth Fleet. 
1922- Commander in Chief, Kure Naval 
District. 
1922- Commander in Chief, Sasebo Ad-
miralty. 
1923- Admiral. 
1924- Commander in Chief, Combll4.ed 
and First Fleets. 
1924- Supreme War Council. 
1925- Chief, Navy General Staff. 
-Supreme War Council. 
- Grand Chamberlain to Emperor. 
1929- Reserve. Grand Chamberlain; 
Privy Council. 
1936- Seriously wounded. 
1936--Resigned as Grand Chamberlain 
and granted rank of baron. 
1940-Vice President, Privy CounciL 
1944- President, Privy Council succeed-
ing late Hara, Y oshimichi; suc-
ceeded as Vice President by 
Shimizu, Toru. 
7 Apr 
10 Apr 
14 Apr 
23 Apr 
9 June 
11 June 
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1945- Premier, upon fall of Koiso Cabi-
net; concurrently Foreign Min-
ister and GEA Minister. (Later 
Shigenori became Foreign Min-
ister.) 
1945-Succeeded as President, Privy 
Council, by Baron Hiranuma, 
Kiichiro. Succeeded as GEA 
Minister by Togo, Shigenori. 
1945- To the amazement of the Japa-
nese press, Suzuki expressed 
profound sympathy for Ameri-
cans in their loss of President 
Roosevelt. He said: "I must 
admit that Roosevelt's leader-
ship has been ·very effective, 
and has been responsible for 
the Americans' advantageous 
position today. For that reason 
I can easily understand the 
great loss his passing means 
to the American people, and 
my profound sympathy goes 
to them." The ,Japanese press 
remarked that these words give 
evidence of Suzuki's calibre, 
and show that he is sincerely 
contributing to "achievement 
of Japan's war aims and the 
welfare of all nations." 
194.')- For the first time since the as-
sumption of his premiership, 
Admiral Suzuki met in a con-
ference with senior statesmen 
including former premiers Baron 
Kiichiro Hiranuma, AdmiralKei-
suke Okada, Prince Kanoye, 
Gen. Hideki Tojo, Koki Hirota, 
and Gen. Kuniaki Koiso. The 
occasion was for an exchange 
of views of the current situation. 
1945- The Tokyo radio reported that 
Premier Suzuki opened an extra-
ordinary 2-day session of the 
Imperial Diet to consider the 
"present national crisis." 
1945- The Japanese radio reported that 
the Lower Chamber of the 
Japanese Diet passed the war-
time emergency bill today with 
slight amendments, giving Ad-
miral Baron Suzuki, Japanese 
Prime Minister, Virtual author-
ity to rule Japan by Imperial 
Decree. 
29 July 1945- The Tokyo radio said that Pre-
mier Suzuki at a press con-
ference declared that Japan 
would ignore the Big Three 
surrender ultimatum and con-
tinue unswervingly the prose-
cution of the war. 
Personal Background: 
Quiet, amiable, energetic, and clever. A good 
administrator, very popular with subordinates. 
An authority on strategy and torpedo tactics. 
He has had duty in England and Germany; 
speaks good English and a little German. Upon his 
retirement in 1929, he became Grand Chamber-
lain and member of the Privy Council. In these 
two posts he became advisor to the Emperor. 
Later in 1929 he opposed the Tanaka Cabinet's 
efforts to saddle the Commander in Chief of 
the Kwantung Army with the entire responsibility 
for the mysterious death of Marshal Chang 
Tso-lin, the Manchurian war lord. Suzuki and 
other advisors of the Emperor insisted that the 
War Minster should also share the responsibility. 
This issue was partly responsible for ihe fall of 
of the Tanaka Cabinet. In 1930, Suzuki was 
also responsible for securing the ratification of 
the London Naval Treaty against the strong 
opposition of the Naval General Staff, the Su-
preme War Council, and high military and naval 
leaders generally." These acts in opposition to the 
more militaristic policies of the armed services 
earned Suzuki the hatred of the rising young 
officer faction. In the military uprising of 26 
February 1936, he was on the assassination list, 
and was severely wounded by three revolver 
shots. 
In December 1936, upon his retirement as 
Grand Chamberlain, he was given the title 
"Baron." He continued to serve on the Privy 
Council although he remained in virtual retire-
ment. In June 1940, he was named Vice President 
of the Privy Council and in 1944 became 
President. 
While Grand Chamberlain, Suzuki was a close 
friend and colleague of such elder .statesmen as 
Viscount Makino, Nobuaki, Lord Privy Seal, 
and Prince Saionji, Kimmochi, Japan's most 
distinguished liberal leader who attempted to 
foster the growth of parliamentary government. 
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TAKAGI, Sokichi, Rear Admiral 
Career: 
1893- Born, Kumamoto, Kyushu. 
1915- Graduate, Naval Academy. 
1928-Went to France to study. 
1930- Assistant Adjutant and Chief Sec-
retary to the Navy Minister. 
1933- Instructor in Naval War College. 
- Commander. 
1936- Member, Naval General Affairs 
Bureau, and research staff of 
same. 
1937- Chief of research section, Naval 
General Affairs Bureau. 
- Captain. 
1939- Instructor of Naval Administra-
tion at the Naval War College. 
1 940- 0nce more Chief of research sec-
tion of the Naval General Af-
fairs Bureau; attached to the 
Ministerial Secretariat. 
Jun 1942- Chief of Staff, Maizuru Naval 
Station. 
1943- Attached to Naval General Head-
quarters. 
- Rear admiral. 
.Mar 1944- Chief, Education Bureau, Navy 
Ministry. 
Sep 1944- Again attached to Navy General 
Headquarters. 
15 Sep 1945- Retired. 
TOGO, Shigenori 
Caree1·: 
Dec 1882- Born, Kagoshima prefecture. 
1908- Graduate, Tokyo Imperial Uni-
versity. 
1912- Entered Foreign Service. 
1913- Served at Hankow, Mukden. 
1916- Switzerland. 
1918- Second Legation Secre.tary. 
191 9- Germany. 
1920- Second Embassy Secretary. 
1921- 23-First Secretary, European and 
American Bureau, Foreign 
Office. 
1925- First Secretary, Embassy m 
Washington, D. C. 
1929- Councillor, Embassy in Berlin. 
....__ ·····-··-
Dec. 1933- Director, European and Ameri-
can Bureau. 
1934-Director, European and Asia 
Bureau. 
1937-Ambassador to Germany. 
1938-40-Ambassador to Russia. 
Apr-Aug 1945-Foreign Minister and GEA Min-
ister, Suzuki cabinet. 
TOJO, Hideki, General 
Career: 
1884- Born, Tokyo. 
1915- Graduate, Military Staff College. 
1919- Aide-de-camp, War Office. 
1919- Resident officer, Germany. 
1922- Instructor, Military Staff College. 
1934- 35- Chief, Mobilization Section. 
- Commanding Officer, First In-
fantry Regiment. 
- Commanding, Officer, Twenty-
fourth Infantry Regiment. 
1937- Chief, Police Affairs, Kwantung 
Bureau. 
-Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army. 
May-Dec1938 -·- War Vice Minister. 
Dec 1938 -·-Director-General, }.f ili tary A Yia-
tion. 
Sep · 1941- Relieved Shigenori Togo as For-
eign Minister until appoint-
ment of Masayuki Tani. 
18 Oct 1941-Appointed Premier, War Min-
ister and Home Minister. 
20 Apr 1943-Relieved Kunihiko Hashida as 
Minister of Education until 
Viscount Okabe was appointed 
23 Apr. 
8 Oct 1943- Took over post of Commerce and 
Industry Minister. 
21 Feb 1944-Chief of Army General Staff. 
18 Jul 1944-Relieved as above by - General 
Yoshijiro Umezu. 
-- ·Resigned with entire Cabinet. 
Also resigned as president of 
IRAA. 
11 Sep 1945- Attempted suicide. 
9 Nov 1945- -Held at Omori Prison Camp 
awaiting trial as war criminal. 
29 Dec 1945-Entered Sugamo Prison. 
Tojo typifies the Kwantung Army and the 
Manchuria "continentalists.'' He has been backt;ld 
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by Gen. Juzo Nishio and Gen. Gen Sugiyama and 
has enjoyed considerable support from the more 
extremist patriotic societies. 
TOYODA, Soemu, Admiral 
Career: 
1885--Born, Tokyo. 
1905- Graduated Naval Academy. 
1917- Lieutenant commander, Gradu-
ated Higher Naval College. 
-Naval attache to Great Britain. 
- ·Naval attache to Germany. 
1921- Commander, executive officer of 
CLKuma. 
1923- Military Affairs Bureau, Naval 
Training College. 
1925- Captain, Naval General Staff; in-
structor, Higher Naval College. 
1926--Commanding officer, CL Yura. 
1927- -Commanding officer of Seventh 
Sub Division. 
1928- Chief of first section, Training 
Bureau; Staff of Special In-
spector, appointed by the Em-
peror. 
1930---Commanding officer, BB Hyuga. 
1 Dec 1931-Rear admiral. 
1932-Staff of Special Inspector ap-
pointed J:-,y the Emperor. 
1933- -Chief of Staff, Combined and 
First Fleets. 
1934-Director, Training Bureau. 
1935- Director, Military Affairs Bureau. 
15 Nov 1935- Vice Admiral. 
1937 -Commander in Chief, North China 
Fleet, Fourth Fleet. 
1938- Commander in Chief, Second 
Fleet. 
1939-· Director, Naval Technical De-
partment. 
1 Jan 1940-Board of Admirals; War Plans 
Reviewing Dept, Imperial Head-
quarters. 
18 Sep 1941-Admiral, Commander in Chief, 
Kure Naval District. 
10 Nov 1942-Supreme War Council. Relieved 
as Commander in Chief, Kure, 
by Vice Admiral Takahashi, 
Ibo. 
21 May 1943-Commander in Chief, Yokosuka 
Naval District; Board of Ad-
mirals. 
51-fay 1944- Commander in Chief, Combined 
Fleet, succeeding Admiral Koga, 
Mineichi, who had been killed 
in action. 
1 May 1945- Concurrently, Commander in Chief, 
Over-all Naval Command; Com-
mander in Chief , Grand Sur-
face Escort, succeeding Admi-
ral Nomura, Naokumi. 
29 1[ay 1945- Chief, Naval General Staff, suc-
ceeding Admiral Oikawa, Rosiro. 
8 Oct 1945- Requested by Baron Shidehara to 
serve as Navy Minister; Toyoda 
withheld consent pending sound-
ing out of Allied opinion. 
2 Dec 1945- 0rdered arrested as a war crim-
inal. 
Personal Background: 
Able and forceful, extremely nationalistic and 
anti-foreign. He is noted for his work as Com-
mander in Chief of Tsingtao landing, and as leader 
of Kwangchow-wan landing, 1937-38. 
UMEZU, Yoshijiro, General 
Career: 
Jan 1882- Born, Tokyo. 
18 Mar 1904--Graduate, Military Academy. 
1904- 1905-- Russo-Japanese War. 
-Stud.ied in Germany. 
- Military attache, Demnark. 
Aug 1930- Major general. 
1930- Commanding general, First Infan-
try Brigade, First Division, To-
kyo. 
Aug 1931--- Chief, General Affairs Depart-
ment, General Staff Headquar-
ters. 
-Instructor, Military Staff College. 
1934- Commanding general, North China 
Garrison; author of Umezu-Ho 
Yingchin agreement. 
1935- -Comrn.anding general, Second Divi-
swn. 
1936-- Vice-Minister of War in Haya-
shi and Terauchi war cabinets. 
1938- Commanding general, First Army, 
North China. 
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Aug. 1939- Commanding general, Kwantung 
Army, Governor, Kwantung 
leased territory, Envoy Extra-
ordinary and Minister Plenipo-
tentiary to Manchukuo Govern-
ment. 
1 Aug 1940- General. 
18 Jnl 1944 - Chief of General Staff Headquar-
ters. 
1944- Succeeded General Tojo as Chief 
of Geneml Staff Headquarters. 
1945- Supreme War Councillor. 
--Honorary Advisor, Concordia So-
ciety, Manchuria. 
2 Sept 1945- Signed surrender on board the U. 
S. S. Missouri on behalf of the 
armed forces . Later attended 
rit~s reporting the end of the 
war to the Imperial ancestors. 
15 Oct 1945 ---Relieved of position as Chief of 
the General Staff. 
Alleged to be a member of the Black Dmgon 
Society. 
Like 'fojo, Umezu is a typical product of the 
Kwantung Army. 
YONAI, Mitsumasa, Admiral 
Career: 
1880- Born, Iwate prefecture. 
1901- Graduated, Naval Academy. 
1913- Graduated, Higher Naval College. 
1916- Commander. Attached to Em-
bassy in Russia for study. 
1917- Sasebo Naval District. 
1918- N avy General Staff. 
1923- Commanding officer, OBB Kasuga; 
commanding officer, BB Iwate . 
1923- Commanding officer, BB Mutsu. 
1 Dec 1925- Rear admiral. 
1926- Chief of Staff, Second Fleet. 
1927- Navy General Staff. 
1928- Commander in Chief, First Ex-
peditionary Fleet (Yangtze 
River). 
1 Dec 1930- Vice admiral. Commander in 
Chief, Chinkai Guard District. 
1932- Commander in Chief, Third Fleet. 
1933- Commander in Chief, Sasebo 
Naval District. 
1934- Commander in Chief, Second 
Fleet. 
~~- ~~-
1 Dec 
2 Feb 
1 Apr 
30 Aug 
14 Jan 
20 Jul 
22 Jul 
7 Apr 
29 Apr 
~-- ~~- ~~~~----~ .. --~----~~~~~~----~~~~~~~c-~--.,~. ~~~~~~~~~-
1935-Commander in Chief, Y okosuka 
Naval District. · 
1936- Commander in Chief, Combined 
and First Fleets; Naval Train-
ing College. 
1937- Navy Minister (In Hayashi, Ko-
noye, and Hiranuma cabinets, 
until 30 Aug 1939). 
1937-Admiral. 
1939- Supreme War Councilor (with 
status as Cabinet Minister). 
1940- Premier. Imperial councilor. 
1944- Named, with General Koiso, Ku-
niaki, to form new Cabinet on 
fall of Tojo. 
1944- Vice Premier, and concurrently 
Navy Minister, in the new 
Koiso cabinet. Restored to 
active service for tenure of office 
as Navy Minister. 
1945- Navy Minister in new Suzuki 
cabinet. 
1945- Adviser to Sensai Engo Kai (War 
R elief Association). 
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' 16 Aug 1945-Named Navy Minister in Higashi-
kuni cabinet. 
20 Nov 1945-Announced intention to retire fol-
lowing the abolition of theN avy 
Ministry. 
Background: 
YON AI is believed to have been responsible for 
making Hayashi dissolve the Cabinet on 31 May 
1937. Grew, in "Ten Years in Japan," tellshow 
Yonai assured Dooman on 19 April 1939 that 
Japan would not join the Axis and would cooperate 
with the Allies. Fleischer, in' 'Volcanic Isle," states 
that a reactionary · plot attempted to assassinate 
Y onai and Imperial Household Minister Tsuneo 
Matsudaira, but was foiled by police with the 
arrest of 38 members of the troops. Reactionaries 
considered Yonai anti-Axis and against the New 
Structure. Col. Kingoro Hashimoto was believed 
to have been one leader behind the plot, but police 
failed to arrest him. Y onai's cabinet fell when 
War Minister Rata presented Army demands for 
strengthening the Nation internally and reorient-
ing foreign policy. Yonai refused and Rata 
resigned as War Minister. The Army would not 
name a successor and the Y onai cabinet fell. 
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